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CONFLICTED MUTUAL FUND VOTING IN CORPORATE 
LAW 
SEAN J. GRIFFITH* & DOROTHY S. LUND** 
ABSTRACT 
Recent Delaware jurisprudence establishes a disinterested vote of 
shareholders as the pathway out of heightened judicial scrutiny. The stated 
rationale for this policy is that shareholders, the real party at interest, are better 
protected by the ballot box than by the courtroom. As long as informed, 
disinterested shareholders with an economic stake in the outcome of the vote 
can effectively express their preferences through voting—the court need not 
scrutinize the underlying transaction. Rather, it can defer to the outcome under 
the business judgment rule. 
But shareholder voting is not always as direct as this reasoning implies. 
Instead, voting outcomes increasingly are determined not by those holding the 
ultimate economic interest but rather by institutional intermediaries who buy, 
hold, and vote shares on behalf of someone else. In this setting, there are several 
predictable circumstances under which institutional voting interests will depart 
from those of the underlying investors. 
This Article develops a typology of institutional investor conflicts of interest. 
We focus on mutual fund intermediaries, which are the key deciders of corporate 
elections and represent the interests of millions of investors when voting. We 
describe and document instances of Cross-Ownership Conflict (situations in 
which funds have interests on both sides of a transaction), Corporate Client 
Conflict (situations in which funds have an interest in currying favor with the 
managers of portfolio companies), and Uniform Policy Conflict (situations in 
which fund sponsors enforce a uniform voting policy irrespective of individual 
fund objectives).  
Our account provides a basis to reevaluate corporate law’s retreat from 
heightened judicial scrutiny. When mutual fund voting is subject to the conflicts 
we describe, the real parties in interest have not necessarily spoken in favor of 
the transaction. As such, courts should consider a broader set of conflicts when 
deciding whether the protection of the business judgment rule is warranted. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In October 2016, Elon Musk pitched a $2.6 billion merger with SolarCity to 
Tesla’s shareholders.1 He described rising carbon dioxide levels, global 
warming, and the inevitable transition to a world fueled only by sustainable 
energy.2 He argued that together, Tesla and SolarCity would forge an “integrated 
future” for the planet.3 The crowd cheered. Someone yelled “Save us, Elon!”4 
What Musk failed to highlight in his fourteen-minute speech was SolarCity’s 
dismal performance. The company’s debt had reached $3.4 billion, sales growth 
had slowed, and it faced a liquidity crisis.5 Without the merger, the company 
would have faced bankruptcy.6 Perhaps more importantly, Musk failed to 
mention the pervasive conflicts of interest, both personal and financial, facing 
Tesla management. Musk chaired both companies and was SolarCity’s largest 
shareholder.7 Beyond these obvious conflicts, SolarCity was founded by Musk’s 
two cousins, with substantial support and encouragement from Musk.8 Musk had 
taken out millions of dollars in personal credit lines to buy more shares in the 
company, and his aerospace company, SpaceX, had purchased $165 million in 
bonds issued by SolarCity.9 Six of Tesla’s seven directors had close ties to 
SolarCity.10 
For  all of these reasons, the market panned the merger. When news of Tesla’s 
$2.6 billion offer was disclosed, Tesla’s stock dropped 10%.11 Jim Chanos, a 
hedge fund manager that had shorted Tesla and SolarCity, called the acquisition 
a “shameful example of corporate governance at its worst” and a “bailout” of 
SolarCity.12 Auto industry experts said the idea of combining the electric-car 
 
1 Austin Carr, The Real Story Behind Elon Musk’s $2.6 Billion Acquisition of SolarCity, 
and What It Means for Tesla’s Future—Not to Mention the Planet’s, FAST COMPANY (June 7, 
2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40422076/the-real-story-behind-elon-musks-2-6-billio 
n-acquisition-of-solarcity-and-what-it-means-for-teslas-future-not-to-mention-the-planets 
[perma.cc/NL7U-MPJ3]. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Plaintiffs’ Answering Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second 
Amended Complaint at 3, In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 12711-VCS (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 28, 2018), 2017 WL 3316057.  
7 Id. at 1-2. 
8 Id. at 2. 
9 Carr, supra note 1. 
10 Id. (“Tesla’s board includes SolarCity’s former CFO, a SolarCity director, and two VCs 
whose firms also have seats on SolarCity’s board, along with Musk’s brother, Kimbal.”). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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manufacturer with a solar energy company made no strategic sense.13 Many 
highlighted existing problems at Tesla as further cause for concern—Tesla was 
cash-strapped and struggling to meet production goals for its Model X. As 
expressed in the Wall Street Journal, “Tesla latching on to SolarCity is the 
equivalent of a shipwrecked man clinging to a piece of driftwood grabbing on 
to another man without one.”14 
Nonetheless, the merger was approved by a wide-margin—excluding the 
votes of Musk and his affiliates, 85% of the company’s shareholders voted in 
favor of the transaction.15 Accordingly, in litigation challenging the merger as 
the product of pervasive conflicts of interest, lawyers for Tesla contended that 
the transaction should receive business judgment protection.16 Tesla relied upon 
Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings, LLC,17 which protects merger-and-
acquisition (“M&A”) transactions from judicial scrutiny when ratified by “the 
fully informed, uncoerced vote of the disinterested stockholders.”18 Because 
Tesla’s shareholders had voted in favor of the merger, the defendants argued 
that the plaintiffs had no recourse. 
The plaintiffs mounted a novel argument in response. The purportedly 
“disinterested” Tesla shareholders included large institutional investors who 
also owned SolarCity stock. The plaintiffs demonstrated that Tesla’s top twenty-
five institutional investors—those holding 45.7% of Tesla’s stock—were 
standing on both sides of the transaction.19 The plaintiffs claimed that this 
rendered the institutional investors “interested” and the deal ineligible for 
business judgment protection.20 Although the Delaware Court of Chancery 
 
13 James B. Stewart, SolarCity and Tesla: Riding on Faith, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2016, at 
B1 (noting that even if deal could lead to vertical integration “[t]hat approach has gone down 
in automotive history as a colossal failure”). 
14 Spencer Jakab, A Double Dose of Risk for Tesla in SolarCity Deal, WALL STREET J. 
(Aug. 1, 2016, 11:59 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-double-dose-of-risk-for-tesla-in-
solarcity-deal-1470067165. 
15 See Robert Ferris, Tesla and SolarCity Merger Gets Approval from Shareholders, 
CNBC (Nov. 17, 2016, 2:59 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/17/solarcity-shareholders-
vote-on-tesla-merger.html [https://perma.cc/TDY5-967M]. 
16 See In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 1560293, at 
*36-37 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018). 
17 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015); see In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 2018 WL 
1560293, at *1. 
18 Corwin, 125 A.3d at 308. For discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 
70-84. 
19 In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 2018 WL 1560293, at *26 n.183. 
20 See id. 
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never ruled on this claim, instead denying dismissal on other grounds,21 the court 
venutred a prediction that the argument would one day resurface.22 We agree. 
That is because institutional investors, mutual fund sponsors23 in particular, 
increasingly control the outcome of corporate elections. Mutual funds have been 
around for at least a century,24 but it was not until 1974 that they began to be a 
force in governance.25 Having been steadily growing for decades, institutional 
investors’ share of U.S. equity markets now stands at over 80%, with mutual 
funds holding more than half of that amount.26 In the past decade, investor 
demand for passively managed mutual funds—index funds and exchange-traded 
funds (“ETFs”)27—has rendered the institutions that favor passive management 
 
21 The Delaware Court of Chancery refused to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint on the 
grounds that Musk qualified as a controlling shareholder of Tesla and that, therefore, Corwin 
did not apply. Id. at *56-57. This was a somewhwat surprising outcome—Musk held only 
22.1% of Tesla. Id. at *42. But despite his controlling less than a quarter of the company’s 
votes, the Court of Chancery concluded there was enough evidence that Musk exerted “actual 
domination and control over . . . the directors” to warrant the conclusion that Musk was a 
controlling shareholder. Id. at *38, *56. 
22 Id. at *32 n.183 (“This issue may resurface in the event Defendants renew their 
ratification defense later in these proceedings.”). 
23 Mutual funds tend to be externally managed by “sponsors,” which develop the funds 
and hire portfolio managers to operate them. See WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE 
FUND 45-50 (2016); John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why 
Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 91 (2010). 
24 The first mutual fund arrived in the United States in the 1890s, although the first modern 
mutual fund was created in 1924. See The History of Mutual Funds, INV. FUNDS INST. CAN., 
https://www.ific.ca/en/articles/who-we-are-history-of-mutual-funds/ 
[https://perma.cc/LG5Z-FTZN] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019). 
25 The passage of the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act (“ERISA”), which 
requires pension funds to support any promised pension with a pool of segregated assets, was 
a primary cause of the growth of mutual funds. See 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2)(A), (b)(1) (2012) 
(setting forth minimum vesting requirements for defined-benefit plans); 29 U.S.C. § 1053 
(2012) (same); id. § 1082 (providing for minimum funding standards). To comply with 
ERISA, companies created retirement accounts that were invested in the capital markets, 
usually mutual funds. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency 
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
863, 879-80 (2013). 
26 Charles McGrath, 80% of Equity Market Cap Held By Insitutions, PENSIONS & INV. 
(Apr. 25, 2017, 11:45 AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/20170425/INTERACTIVE/ 
170429926/80-of-equity-market-cap-held-by-institutions [https://perma.cc/V44R-ERHJ]. 
Institutional ownership of U.S. corporations nearly doubled in the 1980s and 1990s, from 30-
50%, and by 2010 institutional investors held approximately 80% of publicly traded equities 
in the United States. See Mutual Funds, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/topics/1441/ 
mutual-funds/ [https://perma.cc/6V6F-B6WP] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019). 
27 Indexed mutual funds and ETFs now own over 10% of U.S. equities. John C. Coates 
IV, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve 10 (Harv. Pub. Law 
Working Paper No. 19-07, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=324 
7337 (“Passive, indexed U.S. mutual funds and ETFs are now widely understood to hold more 
than 10% of total U.S. equity markets.”). Professor Coates notes that the 10% figure likely 
understates the extent of indexed investment in U.S. markets because institutions other than 
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especially powerful: BlackRock now controls 5% blocks of more than half of 
U.S. publicly traded companies, and Vanguard has 5% blocks in over 40% of 
such companies.28 Moreover, the combined shares of BlackRock, State Street, 
and Vanguard—the “Big Three”—exceed the stake of the largest shareholder of 
40% of all U.S. listed companies, and roughly 88% of the S&P 500.29 
Early observers celebrated the potential of sophisticated institutional 
investors to use the levers of corporate governance—the power to vote, sell, and 
sue—to improve corporate performance.30 Those hopes have been largely 
dashed, and academics now warn of the implications of this concentration of 
corporate ownership in the hands of institutional intermediaries in a number of 
areas, including antitrust policy,31 corporate governance,32 and political 
economy more broadly.33 In this Article, we focus upon the impact of mutual 
fund ownership on shareholder voting.  
Mutual fund voting is typically dictated by the fund’s “sponsors”—the firm 
that assembles and markets the family of funds. A mutual fund is a pool of 
investment securities that issue and sell redeemable common stock and is 
 
registered mutual funds—e.g., pension funds, insurance companies, foreign funds, and 
actively managed funds—also follow indexing strategies. Id. at 10-11. 
28 Amy Deen Westbrook & David A. Westbrook, Unicorns, Guardians, and the 
Concentration of the U.S. Equity Markets, 96 NEB. L. REV. 688, 732 (2018). 
29 Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the Big 
Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial 
Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 313 (2017). 
30 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional 
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 817-20 (1992) [hereinafter Black, Agents Watching 
Agents] (arguing for institutional shareholder oversight); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder 
Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 575-91 (1990) [hereinafter Black, Shareholder 
Passivity] (arguing that institutional shareholders could overcome collective action 
problems); Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An 
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 865 (1991) (providing “a realistic 
agenda for institutional investors” to improve corporate governance of portfolio companies); 
Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 795, 799 (1993) (describing political conflicts of interest that impede activism 
of public pension funds in corporate governance). 
31 See generally Einer Elhauge, Essay, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267 
(2016) (noting antitrust concerns that emerge when large shareholders own shares of 
competing companies); Fiona Scott Morton & Herbert Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding 
and Antitrust Policy, 127 YALE L.J. 2026 (2018) (same). 
32 See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of 
Institutional Investors, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2017, at 89; Dorothy S. Lund, The Case 
Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493 (2018) (describing agency problems 
of passive funds and proposing restriction on voting by passive funds); Lucian Bebchuk & 
Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and 
Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3282794 (describing agency problems of passive funds and supporting evidence). 
33 Coates IV, supra note 27, at 2-3 (arguing that “the rise of indexing presents a sharp, 
general, political challenge to corporate law”). 
  
2019] CONFLICTED MUTUAL FUND VOTING 1157 
 
composed of a broad, diversified portfolio of debt, equity, or other 
investments.34 The fund itself does not do much aside from house investor assets. 
The sponsor manages the fund’s day-to-day operations. Most sponsors counsel 
multiple funds35 and may specialize in funds of a certain type. As mentioned, 
the Big Three specialize in passive management and hold the bulk of their 
investor assets in passively managed funds.36 Others, including Fidelity and T. 
Rowe Price, favor active management strategies and offer more actively 
managed products than passive.37  
Although it is widely acknowledged in the literature that intermediation 
creates conflicts,38 there is, to our knowledge, no systemic account of the 
paradigmatic types of conflict that arise when mutual fund intermediaries control 
corporate voting rights. In this Article, we sort these conflicts into recurrent 
patterns and provide a typology of three basic forms of conflicted institutional 
voting. As the Tesla example shows, institutions may have interests on both 
sides of a transaction or with industry competitors that may cause them to use 
their vote to benefit their investment in another company (SolarCity) to the 
detriment of the real parties in interest (Tesla shareholders). We call this “Cross-
Ownership Conflict.” The second conflict of interest we describe is even more 
straightforward. Mutual fund sponsors often count company management as a 
client for 401(k) accounts or other services. Such conflicts may cause the 
sponsor to cast its votes in order to appease management—the client—even 
when doing so is not in the investors’ best interest. We call this “Corporate 
Client Conflict.” Finally, we describe the conflict that emerges from strict 
adherence to a centralized, institution-wide voting policy, which many mutual 
fund sponsors have adopted. Because the beneficial owners of funds rarely 
overlap, uniform voting will often hurt some mutual fund investors and help 
others.39 We call this “Uniform Policy Conflict.”  
 
34 See John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund 
Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1234-35 (2014). 
35 For example, BlackRock offers investors the choice between nearly two hundred 
different funds, including a variety of index funds, ETFs, target-date funds, and actively 
managed funds. See All BlackRock Funds, MORNINGSTAR, http://quicktake.morningstar.com/ 
fundfamily/blackrock/0C000034YC/fund-list.aspx [https://perma.cc/PR9D-NX7A] (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2019). 
36 For simplicity, we characterize ETFs and index funds—funds that seek to track the 
performance of a market index as cheaply as possible—as “passive funds.” 
37 See Lund, supra note 32 at 517, 519 (noting Fidelity and T. Rowe Price had only 16% 
and 8.9%, respectively, of each entity’s equity invested in passive funds). 
38 See, e.g., Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 573 (2015) 
(documenting agency costs of “intermediary influence” across financial markets). In two 
articles, Professor Ann Lipton has documented many of the mutual fund voting conflicts that 
we highlight. See generally Ann M. Lipton, Essay, Family Loyalty: Mutual Fund Voting and 
Fiduciary Obligation, 19 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 175 (2017) [hereinafter Lipton, 
Family Loyalty]; Ann M. Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, 44 J. CORP. L. 297 (2018) 
[hereinafter Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court].  
39 See generally Lipton, Family Loyalty, supra note 38. 
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Our analysis of the conflicts institutional intermediaries face in voting has 
important implications for investors, regulators, academics, and judges, but our 
focus here is on corporate law. Recent Delaware jurisprudence establishes a 
disinterested vote of shareholders as the pathway out of heightened judicial 
scrutiny of mergers and acquisitions. The stated rationale for this shift is that 
shareholders, the real party at interest, are better protected by the ballot box than 
by the courtroom. In many cases, however, the votes that decide the outcome are 
not exercised by investors with skin in the game but rather by conflicted 
institutional intermediaries.  
We argue therefore that Delaware courts should consider these conflicts 
before counting the votes of institutional intermediaries as “disinterested.” 
Specifically, if a plaintiff presents evidence of a disabling economic conflict—
either Cross-Ownership Conflict or Corporate Client Conflict—the institutional 
investor, like conflicted management, should not qualify as disinterested. Such 
conflicts undermine the rationale justifying the application of a deferential 
standard of review—that the underlying investors have spoken in favor of the 
transaction. Moreover, when there is a conflict, the court lacks assurance that 
fiduciaries are necessarily voting to further their investors’ best interests. In 
some cases, the conflicts may result in a vote that is aligned with investors’ 
interests, but not always. In cases where diversified shareholders favor a vote 
for a value-reducing transaction, that conflict provides an additional reason for 
enhanced scrutiny: the shareholders are not playing the gate-keeper role—
approving good transactions and vetoing the bad—that the court intended they 
would play. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I analyzes how corporate law has 
recently adopted shareholder voting as a substitute for enhanced scrutiny of 
merger transactions. Part II assesses the governance and voting incentives of 
mutual funds and provides a typology of the conflicts that may compromise 
mutual fund voting. Part III offers implications of our analysis for corporate law. 
Part IV closes with a brief summary and conclusion. 
I. DISINTERESTED SHAREHOLDER VOTING AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR 
HEIGHTENED JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 
Corporate law has identified shareholder voting as the route of retreat from 
heightened judicial scrutiny of merger transactions. Emphasizing that voting 
allows owners with a genuine economic stake to decide the fate of the 
transaction, Delaware has largely retreated from judicial scrutiny in M&A cases, 
instead of applying the deferential standard of the business judgment rule, 
provided the shareholder vote in favor of the deal is informed and uncoerced.40 
 
40 Under the business judgment rule, courts abstain from second-guessing and defer to the 
business decisions of the board provided the decisions are not tainted by a conflict of interest, 
in which case the business judgment rule does not apply. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The 
Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 84 (2004) (arguing 
that business judgment rule is a compromise between the board’s authority and the need to 
  
2019] CONFLICTED MUTUAL FUND VOTING 1159 
 
Because this structure can generally be pre-arranged by the transacting parties, 
heightened judicial scrutiny has thus become a relic of the freewheeling 1980s. 
Delaware invented heightened scrutiny to deal with recurring conflict of 
interest problems in both controlling shareholder mergers, in which the 
controller or an affiliate buys out the minority shareholders, as well as in third-
party mergers, in which an unaffiliated third party buys the target company.41 
The jurisprudential standards diverged—“entire fairness” for controlling 
shareholder deals and “enhanced scrutiny” for third-party mergers—because the 
underlying conflicts differ in severity.42 The conflict of interest in controlling 
shareholder deals is direct and immediate because the controller’s interest in 
paying as little as possible for the remainder of the company plainly conflicts 
with the board’s duty to maximize the value of the company at sale.43 By 
contrast, the conflict of interest in third-party mergers is more subtle, resting 
instead upon the insight that when there is no controlling shareholder, target 
boards might be more responsive to incumbent managers’ interests in retaining 
their perquisites and positions than to shareholders’ interests in maximizing the 
value of the company at sale.44 Recently, however, these two situations have 
been reunified in Delaware jurisprudence by the substitution of an informed, 
uncoerced shareholder vote in the former place of heightened judicial scrutiny. 
A. Controlling Shareholder Mergers and the Majority-of-the-Minority Vote 
The reemergence of deference began, in the context of controlling shareholder 
mergers, as a response to litigation patterns in controlling shareholder deals. 
Because entire fairness was a fact-intensive standard of review, cases could not 
be resolved at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stages.45 For 
defendants, this meant being forced into discovery, the costs of which created a 
 
hold boards accountable for their decisions); Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: 
A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 11-13 (2005) 
(describing operation of business judgment rule). 
41 These are also sometimes referred to as “squeeze-out” mergers. 
42 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1986) (applying tougher scrutiny in third party mergers); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 
701, 711-15 (Del. 1983) (requiring fair dealing and fair price in non-arm’s length 
transactions). 
43 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993) (“Classic examples 
of director self-interest in a business transaction involve either a director appearing on both 
sides of a transaction or a director receiving a personal benefit from a transaction not received 
by the shareholders generally.”). 
44 See Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 457-60 (Del. Ch. 2011) 
(describing range of situations to which enhanced scrutiny may apply); J. Travis Laster, 
Revlon Is a Standard of Review: Why It’s True and What It Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 5, 11-18 (2013) (describing possible risks in third-party mergers). 
45 See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (“[P]olicy 
rationale . . . mandates careful judicial scrutiny of a special committee’s real bargaining 
power before shifting the burden of proof on the issue of entire fairness.”). 
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strong incentive to settle.46 Controlling shareholder cases thus began to follow a 
ritualized dance.47 Defendant boards, aware of the burden placed upon them by 
the entire fairness standard, appointed a special negotiating committee in every 
case.48 At the same time, well-advised controllers held back a portion of their 
reservation price so that they could later raise their offer.49 The controller’s 
negotiations with the special committee proceeded contemporaneously with the 
settlement negotiations of any shareholder litigation.50 Both negotiations were 
then brought to a close when the controller raised the price slightly, allowing 
both the special committee and the shareholders’ lawyers to demonstrate their 
value and, in the case of the lawyers, claim fees.51 Yet it remained unclear, in 
spite of all this process, whether anything of substance had changed. 
 
46 See In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 605 (Del. Ch. 2005) 
(“[E]ach Lynch case has settlement value, not necessarily because of its merits but because it 
cannot be dismissed.”). 
47 Indeed, it was referred to by Delaware judges as a “minuet,” or alternatively, a “Kabuki 
dance.” In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945 (Del. Ch. 2010) (referring to 
“the opening steps in the Cox Communications Kabuki dance”); In re Emerging Commc’ns, 
Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *42 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) 
(referring to a “scripted minuet wherein [the Committee] would bargain for a negligible price 
increase . . . [creating] a credible record of ‘arm’s length’ negotiations sufficient to survive 
entire fairness review”). 
48 See Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware 
Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1803 (2004) (“[B]oards 
of target companies in mergers involving conflicts of interest routinely appointed special 
negotiating committees . . . composed of independent directors and charged those committees 
with responsibility for negotiating the best possible terms on behalf of the company’s public 
shareholders.”). 
49 This could be for either of two reasons: (1) the special negotiating committee has real 
negotiating power and uses it to extract price concessions from the buyer; or more cynically 
(2) both sides understand that in order to minimize liability risk, the special litigation 
committee must be seen to be “effective,” for which the increase in price can be offered as 
evidence. If the latter explanation is correct, of course, the controller may merely hold back a 
portion of its ultimate price in the initial offer, such that the price concession extracted by the 
special committee is in fact illusory. 
50 The rough contemporaneity is possible because controlling shareholder transactions are 
often public before the merger agreement is signed. Because these transactions must be 
approved by a special committee, they are typically announced as proposals when the special 
committee is formed, thus allowing shareholder plaintiffs to challenge the proposal and 
thereby become a part of the negotiation with the special committee. See In re Cox Commc’ns, 
879 A.2d at 620 (“Instead of suing once a controller actually signs up a merger agreement 
with a special committee of independent directors, plaintiffs sue as soon as there is a public 
announcement of the controller’s intention to propose a merger.”). 
51 See id. at 621 (“[T]he artistry of defense counsel is to bring the first and second tracks 
to the same destination at the same time. . . . When [the final] price is known but before there 
is a definitive deal, defense counsel . . . makes its ‘final and best offer’ to plaintiffs’ counsel. 
The plaintiffs’ counsel then accepts . . . .”). 
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To address this dynamic, the Delaware Court of Chancery began to 
experiment, first in short-form then in long-form mergers,52 with allowing the 
combination of both special committee approval and a majority of the minority 
shareholder vote, to shift the burden of proof and, eventually, the standard of 
review.53 The shareholder vote was the critical addition here.54 The Delaware 
Supreme Court ultimately adopted the committee and vote structure as a 
substitute for heightened scrutiny in Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp.55 
M & F Worldwide Corp. was a standard controlling shareholder case, but the 
controller had adopted the committee-plus-vote structure from the beginning, 
conditioning the transaction on approval both of a special committee of 
independent directors and a majority vote of the minority shareholders.56 
Accordingly, the Court of Chancery dismissed the inevitable shareholder suit on 
the basis of the procedural protections,57 underscoring the increasing role of 
institutional investors in deferring to the shareholder vote under the business 
judgment rule.58 After the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the Court of 
 
52 The principal distinction between a long-form merger under Delaware law section 251, 
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2019), and a short-form merger under section 253, id. § 253, 
is whether a shareholder vote is required to consummate the transaction. 
53 See In re Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 607 (advocating, in dicta, “unified” standard for 
both long- and short-form mergers provided both procedural protections are met); In re 
Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 19, 
2001) (applying business judgment rule rather than entire fairness to section 253 merger part 
of two-step transaction with other procedural protections, including special committee and 
majority of minority condition); see also In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 
400 (Del. Ch. 2010) (applying entire fairness review because special committee did not 
recommend in favor of tender offer); In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 
758-CC, 2009 WL 3165613, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009) (applying entire fairness review 
rather than business judgment rule because of inadqeuate shareholder protections). 
54 Under the statute, short-form mergers required no shareholder vote at all, and long-form 
mergers did not require the separate approval of a majority of the shares not voted by the 
controller. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 253. 
55 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014). 
56 In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 506 (Del. Ch. 2013) (describing structure of 
transaction). 
57 The Delaware Court of Chancery expressly stated the structural requirements necessary 
to shift the standard of review: the “negotiation and approval by a special committee of 
independent directors fully empowered to say no” and “approval by an uncoerced, fully 
informed vote of a majority of the minority investors.” Id. at 502. 
58 The Court of Chancery emphasized: 
[A] generation ago, our Supreme Court noted the prevalence of institutional investors in 
the target company’s stockholder base in concluding that a proxy contest centering on 
the price of a takeover offer was viable, . . . stating that “[i]nstitutions are more likely 
than other shareholders to vote at all [and] more likely to vote against manager 
proposals.” Market developments in the score of years since have made it far easier, not 
harder, for stockholders to protect themselves. . . . Not only that, institutional investor 
holdings have only grown since 1994, making it easier for a blocking position of minority 
investors to be assembled. 
Id. at 530-31 (footnote omitted). 
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Chancery’s holding on appeal,59 it became clear that the doorway out of entire 
fairness is a transaction structure that provides for both a special negotiating 
committee and a majority of minority vote.60 
B. Third-Party Mergers and the Cleansing Vote 
The reemergence of deference in third-party mergers likewise came about as 
a response to settlement pathologies. The pattern in third-party merger cases was 
for shareholder plaintiffs to file complaints alleging defects in the merger 
process and the merger price and then to amend their claims, once the 
preliminary proxy statement was released, to allege inadequacies in the 
disclosures about the deal.61 The shareholder plaintiffs would seek equitable 
relief—an injunction barring consummation of the transaction—and, in the 
meantime, expedited discovery. Because the Delaware standard—a “colorable 
claim and . . . a possibility of . . . irreparable injury”62—entitled plaintiffs to 
expedited discovery in essentially every case challenging the adequacy of 
merger disclosures,63 which is to say every third-party merger case, defendants 
once again sought settlement to avoid the looming cost of discovery.64 The vast 
 
59 M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d at 654. 
60 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and the 
Court’s Ruling at 66, Swomley v. Schlecht, No. 9355-VCL (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2014), 2014 
WL 4470947 (granting motion to dismiss on the basis of procedural protections and noting 
that “the whole point of encouraging [the M & F Worldwide] structure was to create a situation 
where defendants could effectively structure a transaction so that they could obtain a pleading-
stage dismissal against breach of fiduciary duty claims”). 
61 Delaware courts derived fiduciary duties to disclose from the statutory command that 
mergers be put to a shareholder vote, which is an illusory right if the board does not also 
provide adequate disclosure. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2019) (requiring shareholder 
vote on mergers); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992) (implying disclosure duties 
from mandatory shareholder vote); see Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: 
The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1096 (1996) 
(describing development of duty of disclosure under Delaware corporation law). 
62 Giammargo v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 13845, 1994 WL 672698, at *2 (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 15, 1994). 
63 Shareholders can always argue that they will be irreparably injured by the failure to 
disclose material information prior to the shareholder vote. See In re BioClinica, Inc. S’holder 
Litig., No. 8272-VCG, 2013 WL 5631233, at *4 n.46 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2013) (“The standard 
for a motion to expedite is ‘colorability’ and the standard for a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) is ‘reasonable conceivability’–in my view, a higher, although still minimal, pleading 
burden.”); see also Sinchareonkul v. Fahnemann, No. 10543-VCL, 2015 WL 292314, at *1 
n.1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2015) (“[T]he standard for expedition, colorability, which simply 
implies a non-frivolous set of issues, is even lower than the ‘conceivability’ standard applied 
on a motion to dismiss.” (quoting In re BioClinica Inc., S’holder Litig., 2013 WL 5631233, 
at *1 n.1)). 
64 See Sean J. Griffith & Anthony A. Rickey, Objections to Disclosure Settlements: A 
“How To” Guide, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 281, 290 (2017) (describing importance of discovery in 
motivating settlements and describing process whereby settling parties engage in desultory 
confirmatory discovery rather than serious adversarial discovery). 
  
2019] CONFLICTED MUTUAL FUND VOTING 1163 
 
majority of such settlements involved no monetary relief for the shareholder 
class but only the addition of a small number of supplemental disclosures in the 
merger proxy.65 Nevertheless, the corporate benefit doctrine was invoked to 
allow plaintiffs’ counsel to recover fees from the company, often in the $350,000 
to $700,000 range.66  
The ease of achieving disclosure settlements and attorneys’ fees served only 
to encourage further claims. By 2009, shareholder claims were brought against 
close to 90% of all third-party mergers, a number that held until 2016.67 
Delaware was widely criticized as a haven for wasteful litigation.68 In response, 
the judiciary attempted to address the problem in a number of ways, generally 
unsuccessfully.69 Then, in 2015, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Corwin.70 
In Corwin, the Supreme Court affirmed an opinion of the Court of Chancery 
dismissing a post-closing damages claim against a third-party merger.71 The 
basis for the conclusion was the shareholder vote in favor of the merger, which 
had the effect of cancelling enhanced scrutiny, in favor of business judgment 
rule review. According to the court, an “uncoerced, informed stockholder vote 
is outcome-determinative, even if Revlon applied to the merger.”72 Implicitly 
following the logic of M & F Worldwide, Corwin substitutes the “cleansing 
 
65 Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn 
Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. 
L. REV. 557, 559 (2015). 
66 See Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 13-16 (2015) 
(describing application of corporate benefit doctrine to third-party mergers). 
67 Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015, at 2 (Jan. 
14, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890 (providing empirical 
evidence of litigation activity and outcomes). 
68 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound, 40 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 851, 852 (2016) (contending that merger litigation is a “problem that has 
reached crisis proportions”). 
69 For example, in Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, the Delaware Supreme Court reduced 
the stringency of enhanced scrutiny. 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009); see Lyman Johnson & 
Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 180-93 (2014) 
(documenting declining stringency of Revlon scrutiny). However, as long as plaintiffs could 
still use it to seek injunctive relief, Revlon continued to generate nonmeritorious claims. 
Likewise, in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, the Delaware Supreme Court 
suggested that fee-shifting bylaws might be introduced to deter nonmeritorious litigation. 91 
A.3d 554, 560 (Del. 2014). However, the legislature quickly reversed the judiciary on fee-
shifting. See Dan Awrey, Blanaid Clarke & Sean J. Griffith, Resolving the Crisis in U.S. 
Merger Regulation: A Transatlantic Alternative to the Perpetual Litigation Machine, 35 YALE 
J. ON REG. 1, 59-62 (2018) (proposing regulation as alternative to private litigation as means 
of protecting shareholders in mergers). 
70 Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings, LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 314 (Del. 2015). 
71 Id. at 306. Although much of the dispute in the Court of Chancery was over whether the 
buyer should be treated as a controlling shareholder, the case was decided as if it were a third-
party merger. Id. at 306-08. 
72 Id. at 308. 
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effect” of a shareholder vote for rigorous judicial scrutiny.73 This logic has since 
been extended to two-step tender offer mergers as well.74  
Because it speaks only to damages claims—a class of cases that received 
enhanced scrutiny only grudgingly, if at all75—Corwin may not seem like a 
major shift.76 However, the impact of Corwin becomes clear when it is paired 
with the Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling one year earlier in C & J Energy 
Services, Inc. v. City of Miami General Employees’ & Sanitation Employees’ 
Retirement Trust,77 holding that injunctions should generally not be issued 
where there is no alternative bidder.78 C & J follows longstanding Delaware 
practice in not enjoining transactions if doing so risks leaving shareholders with 
no deal at all,79 but its practical effect is that there is no meaningful prospect of 
an injunction in most cases. Paired with Corwin, C & J creates something of a 
Catch-22. Corwin says enhanced scrutiny is now generally unavailable for 
damages, leaving only injunction cases. And C & J says enhanced scrutiny is 
now generally unavailable for injunctions, leaving only damages cases. Read 
together, the clear message is that enhanced scrutiny is now generally 
unavailable. The sole constraint is now the shareholder vote. 
The irony is that Corwin is not the decision that ended the filing of the easy-
money disclosure cases that had drawn Delaware into disrepute. Those practices 
 
73 According to Professor Charles Korsmo, “Corwin follows directly from [M & F 
Worldwide]. Once you hold that the procedural trappings of an arm’s-length deal entitle a 
majority stockholder squeeze-out to business judgment rule deference, it would be strange 
indeed to deny such deference to an actual arm’s-length deal.” Charles R. Korsmo, 
Delaware’s Retreat from Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers 5 (Jan. 3, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author); see also J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder Approval 
on Enhanced Scrutiny, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1443, 1443 (2014) (arguing that only in 
absence of independent, disinterested, and sufficiently informed decision makers will the 
court apply stringent review). Professor Korsmo also notes, however, that this logic can be 
reversed. Rather than taking M & F Worldwide to its logical conclusion in Corwin, Revlon 
could be read as a correction to M & F Worldwide, suggesting that the right standard of review 
in controlling shareholder cases with procedural protections might be enhanced scrutiny rather 
than business judgment. See Korsmo, supra, at 19, n.101. 
74 In re Volcano Corp. S’holder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 738 (Del. Ch. 2016) (applying 
business judgment review where “disinterested, uncoerced, fully informed stockholders 
tendered a majority of [target company’s] outstanding shares into the Tender Offer”). 
75 Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009), is an example. See supra text 
accompanying note 69. 
76 Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312 (arguing that enhanced scrutiny was designed for injunctions, 
not damages). 
77 107 A.3d 1049 (Del. 2014). 
78 Id. at 1053. 
79 Delaware courts have consistently demonstrated a reluctance to enjoin a transaction in 
the absence of a competing bidder. See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 
439 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“Although a reasonable mind might debate the tactical choices made by 
the El Paso Board, these choices would provide little basis for enjoining a third-party merger 
approved by a board overwhelmingly comprised of independent directors, many of whom 
have substantial industry experience.”). 
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were brought to an end by the Court of Chancery’s 2016 holding in In re Trulia, 
Inc. Stockholder Litigation80 that disclosure settlements provided no 
compensable benefit unless the supplemental disclosures corrected “a plainly 
material misrepresentation or omission.”81 Trulia changed litigation and 
settlement patterns in Delaware and across the nation, as nonmeritorious merger 
claimants fled Delaware in search of more hospitable standards in alternative 
state and federal courts.82 Moreover, Trulia addressed the settlement pathologies 
of third-party merger cases without fundamentally altering substantive law. But 
by the time the Court of Chancery ruled on Trulia, Corwin had already been 
decided. And Corwin, in substituting the shareholder vote for judicial scrutiny, 
fundamentally altered substantive law. 
 
80 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
81 Id. at 898 (emphasizing further that “it should not be a close call that the supplemental 
information is material as that term is defined under Delaware law”). Prior to the articulation 
of this standard in Trulia, numerous Court of Chancery decisions had rejected proferred 
settlements for providing no meaningful benefit to the shareholder class. See In re Aruba 
Networks, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 10765-VCL, slip op. at 73 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015) 
(denying settlement approval and emphasizing that representation is inadequate where 
counsel files litigation when “there wasn’t a basis to file in the first place” but subsequently 
fails to aggressively litigate when discovery turns up valuable information); Acevedo v. 
Aeroflex Holding Corp., No. 9730-VCL, slip op. at 73 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2015) (rejecting 
disclosure-only settlement where plaintiffs settled for “precisely the type of nonsubstantive 
disclosures that routinely show up in these types of settlements”); In re Theragenics Corp. 
Stockholders Litig., No. 8790-VCL, slip op. at 69 (Del. Ch. May 5, 2014) (refusing to approve 
settlement and noting that “when a fiduciary action settles, I have to have some confidence 
that the issues in the case were adequately explored, particularly when there is going to be a 
global, expansive, all-encompassing release given”); Rubin v. Obagi Med. Prods., Inc., No. 
8433-VCL, slip op. at 20-21 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2014) (refusing to approve settlement and 
noting that “the type of global release that plaintiff’s counsel gives in this case and routinely 
gives in return for disclosure settlements provides expansive protection for the defendants 
against a broad range of claims, virtually all of which have been completely unexplored by 
the plaintiffs”); In re Medicis Pharm. Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 7857-CS, slip op. at 24 (Del. 
Ch. Feb. 26, 2014) (refusing to approve settlement because “giving out releases lightly . . . is 
something we’ve got to be careful about”); In re Transatlantic Holdings Inc. S’holders Litig., 
No. 6574-CS (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013) (refusing to approve settlement for lack of “any real 
investigation,” disclosure of additional background information, and in light of the 
overwhelming vote in favor of the transaction); see also In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. 
Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 241, at *20 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 
2015) (approving settlement but noting that “[i]f it were not for the reasonable reliance of the 
parties on formerly settled practice in this Court . . . the interests of the Class might merit 
rejection of a settlement encompassing a release that goes far beyond the claims asserted and 
the results achieved”). 
82 Disclosure claims were driven out of the state, often brought instead in federal court 
under federal law. See Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions 
Can Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT 
IN CHANGING TIMES (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, eds., 2019) (detailing 
flight of disclosure claims from Delaware to other jurisdictions). 
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C. Comparative Competencies: Shareholders Versus Judges 
The basic rationale underlying the shift away from heightened scrutiny in 
M&A transactions is one of institutional competence. In theory at least, voting 
allows owners with a genuine economic stake to decide the fate of the 
transaction. Judges, loathe to act as “super-directors” by substituting their 
judgment for that of the board and the shareholders, are therefore happy to defer 
to the outcome of a fair—that is, uncoerced and fully informed—vote.83 The 
Corwin court provided a clear articulation of this rationale: 
[T]he long-standing policy of our law has been to avoid the uncertainties 
and costs of judicial second-guessing when the disinterested stockholders 
have had the free and informed chance to decide on the economic merits of 
a transaction for themselves. There are sound reasons for this policy. When 
the real parties in interest—the disinterested equity owners—can easily 
protect themselves at the ballot box by simply voting no, the utility of a 
litigation-intrusive standard of review promises more costs to stockholders 
in the form of litigation rents and inhibitions on risk-taking than it promises 
in terms of benefits to them. The reason for that is tied to the core rationale 
of the business judgment rule, which is that judges are poorly positioned to 
evaluate the wisdom of business decisions and there is little utility to 
having them second-guess the determination of impartial decision-makers 
with more information (in the case of directors) or an actual economic stake 
in the outcome (in the case of informed, disinterested stockholders). In 
circumstances, therefore, where the stockholders have had the voluntary 
choice to accept or reject a transaction, the business judgment rule standard 
of review is the presumptively correct one and best facilitates wealth 
creation through the corporate form.84 
This institutional competence rationale has deep roots in Delaware corporate 
law. Many Delaware decisions expressly recognize informed, disinterested 
shareholders as capable of deciding their own fate.85 Furthermore, many 
 
83 Delaware courts have long resisted the “super-director” mantle. See Brehm v. Eisner, 
746 A.2d 244, 266 (Del. 2000) (“To rule otherwise would invite courts to become super-
directors, measuring matters of degree in business decisionmaking and executive 
compensation.”); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *14 
n.13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (“To recognize in courts a residual power to review the substance 
of business decisions for ‘fairness’ or ‘reasonableness’ or ‘rationality’ where those decisions 
are made by truly disinterested directors in good faith and with appropriate care is to make of 
courts super-directors.”). 
84 Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312-14 (Del. 2015) (footnotes 
omitted). 
85 See In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 114-15 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“When 
disinterested stockholders make a mature decision about their economic self-interest, judicial 
second-guessing is almost completely circumscribed by the doctrine of ratification.”); In re 
Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 207 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(“[D]octrines . . . operate to keep the judiciary from second-guessing transactions when 
disinterested stockholders have had a fair opportunity to protect themselves by voting no.”); 
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Delaware decisions suggest that the basis for deference is enhanced when the 
shareholder base contains sophisticated institutional investors.86 An opinion of 
the Court of Chancery notes that deference is especially appropriate when a 
corporate “electorate is dominated by sophisticated institutional investors well-
positioned to vote in an informed manner . . . assuming adequate disclosures.”87 
Delaware’s willingness to defer to the shareholder vote, especially when the 
shareholder base contains sophisticated institutional investors, follows corporate 
law scholarship’s emphasis on the importance of sophisticated institutional 
investors.88 Members of the judiciary, in their extrajudicial writings, have also 
emphasized the role of institutional investors in forcing managers to remain 
accountable to shareholders.89 In a recent contribution to an edited volume, Vice 
Chancellor Laster emphasized “the rise of sophisticated institutional investors 
who have the ability to influence the direction of the corporations in which they 
 
In re PNB Holding Co. S’holders Litig., No. 28-N, 2006 WL 2403999, at *15 (Del. Ch. Aug. 
18, 2006) (“[W]hen most of the affected minority affirmatively approves the transaction, their 
self-interested decision to approve is sufficient proof of fairness to obviate a judicial 
examination of that question.”); Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 901 (Del. 
Ch. 1999) (“In this day and age in which investors also have access to an abundance of 
information about corporate transactions from sources other than boards of directors, it seems 
presumptuous and paternalistic to assume that the court knows better in a particular instance 
than a fully informed corporate electorate with real money riding on the corporation’s 
performance.”). 
86 See In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 619 (Del. Ch. 2005) 
(“[W]ith increasingly active institutional investors and easier information flows, stockholders 
have never been better positioned to make a judgment as to whether a special committee has 
done its job.”); In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 444 (Del. Ch. 2002) 
(“Adherence to the Solomon rubric as a general matter, moreover, is advisable in view of the 
increased activism of institutional investors and the greater information flows available to 
them.”). 
87 In re Staples, Inc. S’holders Litig., 792 A.2d 934, 952 (Del. Ch. 2001) (noting that in 
such cases “this court has been rightly reluctant to interpose its own view of the business 
merits, thereby precluding an opportunity for the genuine stakeholders to make their own 
decision”). 
88 See John Armour, Jack B. Jacobs & Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Evolution of Hostile 
Takeover Regimes in Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework, HARV. 
INT’L L.J., Winter 2011, at 219, 222 (emphasizing presence of sophisticated institutional 
investors as distinguishing characteristic of takeover regimes); Marcel Kahan & Edward 
Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1001 (2010) (emphasizing role of sophisticated 
institutional investors in putting pressure on incumbent managers). 
89 Jack B. Jacobs, Lecture, Does the New Corporate Shareholder Profile Call for a New 
Corporate Law Paradigm?, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 31 (2012) (noting that “the 
new shareholder profile [consisting of concentrated ownership by sophisticated institutional 
investors] is an irrefutable reality that justifies inquiring into whether courts should take that 
into account in formulating and applying fiduciary duty principles”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., One 
Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for 
the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. 
LAW. 1, 14 (2010) (“The potency of the institutional investor community is easy to see. When 
they want something, they tend to get it.”). 
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invest” as one of two “predominant influences” in the evolution of Delaware 
corporate law over the last thirty years.90 According to Laster, “Recognizing that 
stockholders are empowered and capable of making their own decisions changes 
the role of the judiciary . . . . [W]hen stockholders can protect themselves, they 
do not need judges. Only when the voting process itself is undermined does a 
role for the judge remain.”91 Revisions to corporate law jurisprudence followed 
this recognition: “[V]oting by sophisticated stockholders . . . emerged as an 
alternative, market-based means of protecting against fiduciary overreaching.”92 
However, the sine qua non of judicial deference to the vote is disinterest. The 
excesses of controlling shareholders and unaccountable managers are only 
constrained by disinterested shareholder voting. Interested votes count neither 
in a majority of the minority vote under M & F Worldwide nor in a cleansing 
vote under Corwin.93 But mutual fund sponsors have their own set of interests. 
Moreover, as we explore in detail in Part II, below, these interests lead the voting 
preferences of investment funds to conflict with those of their underlying 
investors. This raises the question of how corporate law courts ought to construe 
disinterest in light of the interests of institutional shareholders, a subject we 
explore in Part III, below. 
II. MUTUAL FUND VOTING CONFLICTS 
Mutual fund sponsors—especially the Big Three—are the key voices that 
ultimately dictate the outcome of proxy contests,94 shareholder proposals,95 and 
 
90 See J. Travis Laster, Changing Attitudes: The Stark Results of Thirty Years of Evolution 
in Delaware M&A Litigation, in HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE LITIGATION 202, 203 (Sean 
Griffith et al. eds., 2018) (describing other influence as “the system-wide failure of 
stockholder-led M&A litigation to generate meaningful benefits for investors”). 
91 Id. at 222-23. 
92 Id. at 225. 
93 Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 306 (Del. 2015) (listing shareholder 
disinterest as element of vote); Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 
2014) (constituting relevant minority shareholders as those, unlike controller, disinterested in 
transaction). 
94 See, e.g., Michael Blanding, Vanguard, Trian, and the Problem of “Passive” Index 
Funds, HARV. BUS. SCH. WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Jan. 30, 2017), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/ 
passive-index-fund-leaders-push-for-shareholder-reforms [https://perma.cc/W4KN-Y8BW] 
(“Trian, recognizing the growing power of index funds, tried to persuade three index investors 
in DuPont—Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street—to support its management reform 
package. All three funds refused to go along, although the assent of just one of them would 
have tipped the balance in favor of Trian’s plan.”). 
95 Steven Mufson, Financial Firms Lead Shareholder Rebellion Against ExxonMobil 
Climate Change Policies, WASH. POST (May 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/energy-environment/wp/2017/05/31/exxonmobil-is-trying-to-fend-off-a-shareholder-
rebellion-over-climate-change/?utm_term=.f7e1c824faa7 (reporting that BlackRock and 
Vanguard owned 13% of ExxonMobil and that their votes were pivotal in passage of 
shareholder proposal seeking improved disclosure about effects of climate change). 
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say on pay.96 Initially, observers theorized that these institutional investors—
because they often hold large, concentrated stakes in companies—could 
overcome the rational apathy plaguing diversified shareholders and serve as 
active participants in governance.97 But mutual funds largely disappointed in this 
respect, especially when judged by shareholder proposals.98 At one point, their 
dismal voting records prompted regulatory scrutiny, which lead to a Securities 
and Exchange Comission (“SEC”) rule requiring mutual funds to disclose all of 
their votes.99 The SEC also made clear that mutual fund advisors have a fiduciary 
duty to vote investor proxies in the clients’ best interests.100 Fund sponsors have 
essentially interpreted this duty as a requirement to vote all of their portfolio 
company shares—an impressive feat that today requires a single sponsor to cast 
hundreds of thousands of votes for thousands of portfolio companies annually.101 
To manage this task, most mutual fund sponsors generally centralize their 
voting and governance activities within a corporate governance team.102 These 
teams are in charge of enacting the voting policy for the funds housed within the 
institution, regardless of the investment strategy. In most cases, they also cast all 
of the funds’ votes. These centralized corporate governance teams tend to be 
 
96 Cf. Miguel Antón et al., Research: Index Funds Are Fueling Out-of-Whack CEO Pay 
Packages, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 18, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10/research-index-funds-
are-fueling-out-of-whack-ceo-pay-packages (arguing that the Big Three may influence 
executive pay packages). 
97 See Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 30, at 815 (exploring “potential 
promise” of oversight by institutional investors); Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 30 
at 575-91 (arguing “institutional shareholders could find it in their self-interest to take an 
active interest in corporate governance”); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 30, at 865 
(providing “realistic agenda for institutional investors” to improve corporate governance of 
portfolio companies). 
98 Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 887 (noting “over the 2007 through 2009 proxy 
seasons, mutual funds offered only seventeen (0.9%) shareholder proposals addressed to 
corporate governance or performance issues”); Edward Rock, Institutional Investors in 
Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 
363, 383 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-George Ringe eds., 2018) (explaining that institutional 
investors suffer from misalignment of incentives that causes them to be relatively passive 
when it comes to corporate governance). 
99 Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered 
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 
6565 (Feb. 7, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 249, 270, 274). 
100 Id. at 6564. 
101 See VANGUARD, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ANNUAL REPORT 34 (2018), 
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/perspectives-and-commentary/2018_ 
investment_stewardship_annual_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DKX8-2HXQ] (noting that 
Vanguard funds cast nearly 169,000 individual votes in 2018 proxy year and 170,000 in 
2017). 
102 This trend is relatively recent; a decade ago, most mutual funds relied on third party 
proxy advisors to cast votes. Today, some continue to do so, delegating voting decisions to 
proxy advisors such as Institutional Shareholder Servces (“ISS”) or Glass Lewis, although 
most of the large sponsors have spoken out against this practice. 
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small—as of January 2017, Vanguard employed twenty people charged with 
engagement and voting at about 13,000 companies; BlackRock, about thirty-one 
people for 14,000 companies; and State Street, eleven people for 9,000 
companies.103 Accordingly, corporate governance groups rely on active fund 
managers to provide information about portfolio companies in advance of a 
vote.104 By contrast, index portfolio managers are not given a say in the voting 
of their portfolio holdings.105 
Most, but not all, corporate governance groups seek to achieve uniformity in 
voting across funds.106 In 2017, Morningstar generated a report based on 
interviews with corporate governance teams that included details about the 
governance policies for different sponsors.107 For some, active fund managers 
may give input before a vote, but they must ultimately follow the corporate 
governance team’s recommendation even if they disagree. State Street and 
Vanguard, for example, give their governance teams the ultimate authority on 
final voting decisions.108 Tellingly, the funds explain that this is meant to ensure 
“consistency and efficacy, as well as to minimize potential conflicts of interest 
[which] arise when views of internal portfolio managers differ between each 
 
103 See Sarah Krouse, David Benoit & Tom McGinty, Meet the New Corporate Power 
Brokers: Passive Investors, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 24, 2016, 10:41 AM), https://www.ws 
j.com/articles/the-new-corporate-power-brokers-passive-investors-1477320101. For updated 
numbers, see Madison Marriage, BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street Bulk Up Governance 
Staff, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/657b243c-e492-11e6-9645-
c9357a75844a. 
104 See generally HORTENSE BIOY ET AL., MORNINGSTAR, PASSIVE FUND PROVIDERS TAKE 
AN ACTIVE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP (Dec. 2017), https://www.morning 
star.com/content/dam/marketing/shared/pdfs/Research/Morningstar-Passive-Active-
Stewardship.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7QD-B7DV]. Invesco provides a unique example: its 
voting platform allows active fund managers to debate in advance of a vote and that process 
determines the voting position for the sponsor as a whole. BONNIE SAYNAY & HENNING STEIN, 
INVESCO, PROXY VOTING: THE HALLMARK OF ACTIVE OWNERSHIP 8 (2017), 
https://www.de.invesco.com/de/dam/jcr:3c5c700c-3a3c-4449-88fb-67679b937ff4/ESG_ 
White_paper_Proxy_voting_the_hallmark_of_active_ownership.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X49U-KAVC]. 
105 BIOY ET AL., supra note 104, at 14. 
106 See Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Who Calls the Shots? How Mutual Funds 
Vote on Director Elections, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 35, 48 (2013) (finding evidence that mutual 
funds tend to economize by centralizing their voting decisions when it comes to director 
elections); Angela Morgan et al., Mutual Funds as Monitors: Evidence from Mutual Fund 
Voting, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 914, 921 (2011) (finding forty-nine of ninety-four mutual fund 
families coordinate voting at family level, resulting in identical voting on 90% of proposals 
on average, although some fund families have much higher levels of divergence in voting); 
Burton Rothburg & Steven Lilien, Mutual Funds and Proxy Voting: New Evidence on 
Corporate Governance, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 157, 162 (2006) (studying voting practices of 
top ten mutual fund families and noting that all fund families but one voted their shares in 
uniform block for each issue). 
107 See generally BIOY ET AL., supra note 104. 
108 Id. at 42, 46. 
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other and with the stewardship team.”109 In other words, the mutual fund 
sponsors acknowledge that there can be divergence in views between funds, and 
yet the funds’ votes will be cast in a direction the governance team choses. If a 
fund manager disagrees with the governance group’s voting recommendation, 
the manager’s only recourse is to divest.110 As a result of this policy, both State 
Street and Vanguard funds have impressive uniformity in voting; in 2015, only 
195 out of 100,000 (or less than 2%) of proposals at State Street featured a fund 
voting differently than its other funds; at Vanguard, only six per 100,000 
(0.006%) proposals received differing votes.111 
By contrast, some fund sponsors maintain a preference for consistency while 
allowing divergent voting. At BlackRock, for example, the active fund managers 
can depart from the house view if they disagree with it.112 Nonetheless, in 2015, 
a BlackRock fund voted differently from all of the other funds in only eighteen 
per 100,000 (or 0.018%) proposals.113 Similar to BlackRock, T. Rowe Price’s 
fund managers have discretion to cast the funds’ votes differently than the 
governance team recommends. However, the manager who chooses to do so 
must document her reasons for departing from the governance team’s 
recommendation.114 At the more extreme end of the spectrum is AIM/Invesco, 
which, in addition to allowing its funds to vote differently from each other, 
empowers them to promulgate and follow different voting policies.115  
Fidelity is the sole mutual fund sponsor that delegates voting for its index 
funds to a sub-advisor, Geode.116 As a result, Fidelity displays much higher 
levels of disagreement in its proxy voting, with funds voting differently from 
other funds in 3,144 per 100,000 (or 3.14%) of votes.117 But even at Fidelity, the 
degree of centralization is high. And owing to their commitment to uniformity 
in voting, mutual fund sponsors are able to leverage their heft in ways that are 
often outcome determinative. 
 
109 Id. at 14. 
110 See id. at 42. 
111 Fichtner, Heemskerk & Garcia-Bernardo, supra note 29, at 316-17. 
112 BIOY ET AL., supra note 104, at 14 (“[A]t BlackRock, Amundi, and UBS, the policy is 
for active fund managers to vote consistently across all funds, but they retain the authority to 
vote differently from the house view.”) 
113 Fichtner, Heemskerk & Garcia-Bernardo, supra note 29, at 317. 
114 See Donna F. Anderson, T. Rowe Price’s Investment Philosophy on Shareholder 
Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 18, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/18/t-rowe-prices-investment-philosophy-on-
shareholder-activism/ [https://perma.cc/9E98-9U39] (noting it is not uncommon for different 
T. Rowe funds to cast different votes for the same proxy contest). 
115 See Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds, 
85 J. FIN. ECON. 552, 561 (2007) (noting AIM funds typically vote for certain policies while 
Invesco funds typically vote against those same policies). 
116 Id. at 560. 
117 Fichtner, Heemskerk & Garcia-Bernardo, supra note 29, at 317. 
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Mutual fund voting is subject to serious and recurring conflicts of interest 
between the fund sponsor and its investors. As Professor Ann Lipton, who was 
among the first to explore the conflicts between funds and sponsors, put it, 
“Today’s conflicts . . . represent a pervasive, baseline characteristic of the 
market, and they are growing.”118 In the Sections that follow, we provide a 
typology of three such conflicts. The first, Cross-Ownership Conflict, 
encompasses conflicts of interest that pit the institution against a company’s real 
parties in interest. Broad diversification means that mutual funds are often empty 
voters, with an incentive to cast a vote to benefit other investments. Second, we 
explore Corporate Client Conflict, which encompasses conflicts of interest that 
arise from the sponsor’s status as a profit-maximizing institution. Finally, we 
note Uniform Policy Conflict—that is, intra-institutional conflicts of interest that 
result when beneficial ownership differs across funds but sponsors nonetheless 
adhere to a centralized voting strategy. In those situations, a course of action that 
is likely in the best interest of one group of investors is unlikely to be wealth-
maximizing for another. 
A. Cross-Ownership Conflict 
Most U.S. publicly held corporations have a one-share, one-vote structure in 
which voting power is proportional to a shareholder’s economic ownership in 
the company. Economists contend that this structure promotes efficient 
corporate decisionmaking because the shareholders with the largest financial 
stakes in the company and, accordingly, the greatest incentive to maximize the 
corporation’s wealth, will have the greatest influence.119 However, the rise of 
institutional investing and broadly diversified shareholding complicates this 
rationale: today, the largest corporate shareholders are widely diversified mutual 
fund sponsors with interests elsewhere. 
We are not the first to explore this problem. In their groundbreaking work, 
Professors Henry Hu and Bernard Black demonstrated that hedge funds could 
engage in “empty voting” through complex financial transactions that decouple 
voting rights from economic interest.120 They showed that hedge funds can wield 
substantial voting power while having limited, zero, or even negative economic 
 
118 Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, supra note 38, at 118-19; see also Jill Fisch, Assaf 
Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Passive Investors 2 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., 
Working Paper No. 414, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=319 
2069 (“[T]he rise of passive investing has the potential to raise concerns about . . . conflicts 
of interest . . . .”). 
119 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) 
(developing theory of optimal ownership structure of firms). 
120 See generally Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting 
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006). Professors Frank Partnoy 
and Shaun Martin were the first to identify the phenomenon of “encumbered shareholding,” 
where shareholders use financial transactions to trade votes. See generally Shaun Martin & 
Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775. 
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ownership in the underlying company. In this latter situation, the empty voter 
would have an incentive to vote in ways that reduce the company’s share 
price.121 
Despite the seriousness of these conflicts, the SEC has not yet acted to contain 
them. This may be because the incidence of “empty” hedge fund activism is 
relatively low, with the exception of a few prominent examples.122 By contrast, 
the problem of mutual fund empty voting is likely to be much more pervasive 
than hedge fund empty voting.123 
Because mutual funds are highly diversified, they are very likely to stand on 
two or more sides of an issue. And as they have grown in popularity, mutual 
funds have not only grown their existing investments, but have also expanded 
into new investment opportunities. This expansion has led to an increase in 
significant cross-holdings.124 In 1985, “the five largest shareholders of any given 
S&P 500 firm would hold 17% of that firm and 2% of another randomly selected 
firm in the index.”125 By 2005, those numbers had risen to 26% and 10%.126 Put 
differently, share ownership has become so concentrated that “in a hypothetical 
conflict between two S&P 500 firms in 2005, 15% of the equity in either firm 
would on average be held by institutional investors that prefer the other side to 
win.”127 And as investor assets continue to pour into mutual funds, the incidence 
of significant cross-holdings grows more likely every day. 
Most mutual fund sponsors admit that their centralized voting strategy 
requires them to aggregate all of their funds’ votes and cast them uniformly in 
 
121 Hu & Black, supra note 120, at 815. The merger between Mylan Laboratories and King 
Pharmaceuticals provides an example. When Mylan announced that it agreed to buy King at 
a substantial premium, Mylan’s shares dropped sharply. The hedge fund Perry, which had a 
substantial stake in King and wanted the deal to go through, then bought nearly 10% of Mylan, 
becoming its largest shareholder. But Perry hedged the market risk associated with these 
shares, meaning that its overall economic interest in Mylan was negative. Therefore, Perry 
was incentivized to use its shares in Mylan to overpay for King. Id. at 816. 
122 See KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP, PROXY VOTE PROCESSING ISSUES: OVER-VOTING 
AND EMPTY VOTING 3 (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.kattenlaw.com/files/21384_Proxy-Vote-
Processing-Issues.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9SH-JLNV] (“We are not aware of any information 
tending to show that empty voting occurs with any frequency.”); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard 
Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 625, 652, 661-81 (2008) (listing worldwide examples of empty voting). 
123 Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, supra note 38, at 118-19; Bernard S. Scharfman, 
Mutual Fund Advisors’ “Empty Voting” Raises New Governance Issues, CLS BLUE SKY 
BLOG (July 3, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/07/03/mutual-fund-advisors-
empty-voting-raises-new-governance-issues [https://perma.cc/WY2B-3JJ4]. 
124 Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, supra note 38, at 310 (citing Jarrad Harford, Dirk 
Jenter & Kai Li, Institutional Cross-Holdings and Their Effect on Acquisition Decisions, 99 
J. FIN. ECON. 27, 36 (2011)). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
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the way that is most likely to benefit the institution as a whole.128 In some cases, 
that would require voting the shares of one company in order to benefit other 
investments. The clearest examples involve M&A transactions, when mutual 
funds stand on both sides of the transaction and there can be an obvious winner 
and loser.129 Consider a stylized example: Company A management decides to 
buy Company B, and the merger is viewed by the market as an excellent outcome 
for Company B, which has been struggling to make interest payments on debt 
and has had a number of setbacks in the past year. The market is less positive 
about the prospect for Company A, which will assume many debts and liabilities 
from Company B. Nonetheless, Company A shareholders overwhelmingly 
approve the merger. They do not look back even when Company A’s share price 
falls with the announcement of the deal. 
What is going on here? Company A’s ten largest shareholders are 
sophisticated institutional blockholders—why did they voluntarily agree to a 
merger that clearly decreased the value of their investment? The answer may be 
that most of the large institutional investors in Company A also hold large 
investments in Company B and are therefore hedged.130 This means that their 
incentives to oppose the deal may be dampened or even reversed depending on 
the size of their investment in each company. Putting aside the question of 
whether this is a good outcome for the institution’s investors, it is unlikely to be 
in the best interest of the Company A shareholders, who now hold less valuable 
stock. 
This example is not merely hypothetical. Tesla’s acquisition of SolarCity, as 
described in the introduction, is a prominent recent example. But there are 
others. For example, in 2003, Bank of America’s plan to acquire FleetBoston 
Financial was overwhelmingly approved by shareholders who stood on both 
sides of the transaction, despite the fact that Bank of America’s market 
capitalization decreased by $9 billion when the merger was announced; notably, 
FleetBoston’s market capitalization increased by approximately the same 
amount.131 The fact that Bank of America’s ten largest shareholders—all 
institutional investors—alone lost more than $2 billion in the transaction did not 
stop them from voting to approve it—most of those losses were neutralized or 
even reversed because of their positions in FleetBoston.132 Professor Ann Lipton 
has compiled a further series of deals in which overlapping ownership affected 
 
128 See generally BIOY ET AL., supra note 104. 
129 Cf. Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, supra note 38, at 298 (“The shifts are 
particularly visible when it comes to mergers and acquisitions, where courts have long 
recognized that directors face special conflicts not present in other kinds of transactions.”). 
130 Id. at 311 (noting that when “investors stand on both sides of the deal, they are hedged; 
any expenses paid by the acquirer benefit them in their capacity as a holder of target stock”). 
131 Gregor Matvos & Michael Ostrovsky, Cross-Ownership, Returns, and Voting in 
Mergers, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 391, 391 (2008). 
132 Id. (noting that this example is “by no means an exception”). 
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transaction dynamics.133 These include Jos. A. Bank’s 2014 acquisition of Men’s 
Wearhouse134 and Anheuser-Busch InBev’s 2016 acquisition of SABMiller.135 
Empirical evidence further indicates that institutional investor cross-
ownership is a feature and not a bug of the modern M&A environment. An 
analysis of M&A deals involving publicly traded companies during 1998-2004 
revealed that in 41.7% of the deals, the acquiring and target firms shared some 
of the same owners.136 Another study observed that, for the average merger, 18% 
of the acquirer’s stock is held by target institutional owners and 21% of target 
stock is held by acquirer institutional owners.137 And as assets continue to flood 
into broadly diversified passively managed funds, the prevalence of cross-
ownership will only grow. 
Of course, the cross-holders who voted to approve these mergers may have 
done so for a number of reasons, including that the deal was in the best interest 
of both companies. But empirical evidence suggests that cross-holders are using 
their voting power to approve value-destroying mergers. A 2008 study showed 
that institutional investors with cross-holdings were more likely to vote for 
mergers with negative announcement returns, while mutual fund owners without 
cross-holdings tended to vote against them.138  
In sum, there is ample evidence that cross-holdings affect a mutual fund 
family’s voting on M&A decisions, but it is likely that these conflicts also affect 
votes on other issues. As investors continue to flock to mutual funds, and 
specifically passively managed mutual funds, it is increasingly likely that the 
 
133 See Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, supra note 38, at 117-18. 
134 Jos. A. Bank’s offer letter emphasized the overlap in the shareholder base as a source 
of value for Men’s Wearhouse shareholders. See Alex Gavrish, Jos. A Bank and Men’s 
Wearhouse Leave Investors Puzzled, VALUEWALK (Jan. 2, 2014, 10:09 AM), 
http://www.valuewalk.com/2014/01/jos-bank-mens-wearhouse-leave-investors-puzzled/ 
[https://perma.cc/G8W7-KV7Q] (“The transaction can therefore provide unique benefits to 
shareholders of Men’s Wearhouse, as they will receive a premium for their shares and at the 
same time will remain shareholders of the merged entity by being also shareholders of Jos. A. 
Bank Clothiers Inc . . . .”). 
135 Shareholder approval was likely, financial advisors predicted, because many of Miller’s 
largest shareholders held stakes in Anheuser-Busch. And indeed, in spite of opposition to the 
deal coming from hedge funds with concentrated stakes in Miller, the deal was ultimately 
approved thanks to the vote of the large institutional cross-holders. See Eyk Henning & Tripp 
Mickle, Business News: Beer Deal Nears Reckoning—Hedge Funds May Hold Key to 
Approval for AB InBev’s Takeover of SABMiller, WALL STREET J., Sept. 21, 2016, at B3. 
136 See Maria Goranova, Ravi Dharwadkar & Pamela Brandes, Owners on Both Sides of 
the Deal: Mergers and Acquisitions and Overlapping Institutional Ownership, 31 STRAT. 
MGMT. J. 1114, 1115 (2010) (analyzing 2,688 M&A deals during between 1998 and 2004). 
137 Chris Brooks, Zhong Chen & Yeqin Zeng, Institutional Cross-Ownership and 
Corporate Strategy: The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions, 48 J. CORP. FIN. 187, 189 (2018) 
(sampling 2,604 mergers between 1984 and 2014). 
138 Matvos & Ostrovsky, supra note 131, at 391 (characterizing this as product of conflict 
of interest). But see Harford, Jenter & Li, supra note 124, at 27 (finding that investors with 
cross-holdings were not influential enough to impact most bids). 
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pivotal voters will have significant conflicts of interest as a result of cross-
holdings. 
B. Corporate Client Conflict 
Mutual fund sponsors experience another more nefarious conflict of interest 
that often pits the institution against its own investors.139 Mutual fund sponsors 
profit from fees charged to funds, which are calculated based on the fund’s assets 
under management. Company management is a large source of 401(k) assets 
invested in mutual funds, as well as an actual or potential client for other 
services. For this reason, the fund sponsor has an incentive to cast investor 
proxies in favor of management—the client—even when voting with 
management is not in its investors’ best interests.140 
As one example, consider BlackRock, one of the world’s largest asset 
managers with over $6 trillion assets under management (“AUM”).141 As it has 
grown in size, BlackRock has articulated a commitment to active involvement 
in corporate governance, and while one of us has voiced skepticism about the 
institution’s incentives and capacity to follow through on this promise,142 
nobody can deny that BlackRock is extremely influential.143 In addition, 
 
139 See Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 30, at 524-25 (“These conflicts . . . may 
explain why many institutions vote promanager on proposals that are likely to reduce share 
price.”); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1056 (2007) (noting that voting against 
management can jeopardize 401(k) clients). 
140 This conflict results in problems for investors in other contexts. See William A. 
Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the Mutual Fund 
Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1401 (2006) (explaining different forms of investment 
management malfeasane as arising out of the fund adviser’s incentive to generate fees); Tamar 
Frankel, Advisory Fees: Evolving Theories, INV. LAW., Feb. 2003, at 21, 21 (arguing that 
fund’s aggressive sales team can increase profits more than good performance); John P. 
Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 
26 J. CORP. L. 609, 672 (2001) (arguing advisor fees are grossly inflated); Paul G. Mahoney, 
Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2004, at 161, 162 
(detailing alleged improper trading practices among funds resulting from conflicts of interest). 
141 About Us, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/au/individual/about-blackrock 
[https://perma.cc/7NC6-XEC7] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019). This is especially impressive when 
you consider that U.S. mutual funds currently manage approximately $19 trillion in client 
assets. Total Net Assets of US-Registered Mutual Funds Worldwide from 1998 to 2017 (in 
Trillion U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/255518/mutual-fund-
assets-held-by-investment-companies-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/67T6-Q94A] 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2019). 
142 See Lund, supra note 32, at 511 (arguing passive funds have no financial incentive to 
ensure portfolio companies are well run); see also Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 32, at 
90 (arguing index funds have “especially poor incentives” to improve corporate governance). 
143 See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, BlackRock’s Message: Contribute to Society, or Risk 
Losing Our Support, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2018, at B1 (“Mr. Fink has the clout to make 
[demands on companies]: His firm manages more than $6 trillion in investments through 
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BlackRock is a public company, which means that unlike Fidelity and Vanguard, 
it is required to file periodic reports with the SEC, making it easier to understand 
the adviser’s business model.144 
Here is what we know about BlackRock from its SEC filings. About 40% of 
BlackRock’s AUM, or $2.4 trillion, come from corporate pension plans.145 Like 
most large mutual fund sponsors, BlackRock offers its clients the choice 
between active and passive management, but most of BlackRock’s invested 
assets are in passively managed funds—BlackRock has about $1.6 trillion in 
actively managed funds and $3.9 trillion in index funds and ETFs.146 BlackRock 
profits from those funds as a result of the management fees it collects. 
BlackRock typically calculates investment management fees as a percentage 
of AUM, but active fund managers charge a substantially greater percentage of 
AUM in fees. As a result of these higher fees, BlackRock’s smaller share of 
active funds generates an equal amount of revenue as its passive funds—
approximately $1.3 billion each quarter.147 In total, these fees make up about 
88% of BlackRock’s quarterly revenue.148 
In the past few years, however, BlackRock, like all mutual fund sponsors, has 
faced pressure to lower fees. This is in part because competition over fees has 
become more intense; investors are increasingly selecting mutual funds on the 
basis of fees, putting pressure on institutions to lower them.149 Fee competition 
is particularly intense for passively managed mutual funds, which often 
highlight their low fees to lure investors.150 
As a result, BlackRock has focused on diversifying its revenue sources, 
including by providing other services to corporations and other institutional 
clients. For an annual fee, BlackRock offers a proprietary investment system 
(“Aladdin”), as well as risk management, outsourcing, and advisory technology 
systems to clients.151 Although these systems generate a mere $677 million 
 
401(k) plans, exchange-traded funds and mutual funds, making it the largest investor in the 
world, and he has an outsize influence on whether directors are voted on and off boards.”). 
144 Note that by choosing BlackRock as an example, we do not suggest that it experiences 
more severe conflicts than other mutual fund sponsors. These conflicts likely exist at all 
institutional investors. 
145 BLACKROCK, BLACKROCK 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2017), http://ir.blackrock.com/ 
Cache/1500109547.PDF [https://perma.cc/3P48-3YU3]. 
146 Chris Flood, BlackRock’s Rivers of Gold from Active Management, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 
15, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/f62ed0c2-ada1-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4. 
147 Id. 
148 BLACKROCK, Q4 2017 EARNINGS: EARNING RELEASE SUPPLEMENT 6 (Jan. 12, 2018), 
http://ir.blackrock.com/Cache/1001230788.PDF [https://perma.cc/7RBZ-2VBA]. 
149 Jason Zweig & Sarah Krouse, Fees on Mutual Funds and ETFs Tumble Toward Zero, 
WALL STREET J., Jan. 27, 2016, at A1. 
150 Fidelity has even taken the bold step of offering two index funds that charge no fees. 
Justin Baer, Fidelity Eliminates Fees on Two New Index Funds, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 1, 
2018, 5:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fidelity-index-fund-fees-tumble-to-zero-
1533141096 (describing reduction as method to exert pressure on low-cost rivals). 
151 BLACKROCK, supra note 145, at 3. 
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(about 5%) in annual revenue, BlackRock hopes that these systems will account 
for 30% of the institution’s revenue in the next five years.152 BlackRock’s CEO, 
Larry Fink, also views this business as an important part of BlackRock’s 
competitive success. Indeed, in 2016, Aladdin’s revenues rose 13% while 
BlackRock’s management fees in its investment business declined slightly.153 
BlackRock is not unique in this respect—large mutual fund sponsors often 
provide a range of client services, including brokerage, underwriting, insurance, 
or banking services, to the company whose management is soliciting proxies. 
In sum, like most large mutual fund sponsors, the bulk of BlackRock’s 
revenue comes from corporate pension fund accounts. However, due to intense 
competition and regulatory pressure,154 it is unlikely that BlackRock will be able 
to increase fees—instead, it will have to bring in new assets or sell additional 
services to clients to maintain its breakneck growth. And BlackRock, as well as 
State Street and Vanguard, likely feel this pressure more than institutional 
investors that primarily focus on active management.155 Investors choose those 
institutions because of their passive investment vehicles, which are designed to 
mimic indices and thus offer investors the same performance as rival passive 
funds. That means that these institutional investors will have a difficult time 
winning new clients on the basis of fund performance. An easier way to increase 
 
152 See id. at 19 (“The sophisticated risk analytics that BlackRock provides via its 
technology platform to support investment advisory and Aladdin clients are an important 
element of BlackRock’s competitive success.”). 
153 See id. at 45. 
154 For example, in June 2016, the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and 
Examinations announced that SEC examiners will scrutinize whether advisors have conflicts 
of interest when making recommendations about share classes to their clients. OFFICE OF 
COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, OCIE’S 2016 SHARE 
CLASS INITIATIVE 1 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/ocie/announcement/ocie-risk-alert-2016-
share-class-initiative.pdf [https://perma.cc/YF23-R7Y7] (“[A]n investment advisor has failed 
to uphold its fiduciary duty when it causes a client to purchase a more expensive share class 
of a fund when a less expensive class of that fund is available.”). 
155 We recognize that active fund managers also have an incentive to be deferential to 
management, especially because access to management can help with discretionary trading 
decisions. See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Are Active Mutual Funds More Active Owners 
than Index Funds?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/03/are-active-mutual-funds-more-active-owners-
than-index-funds/ [https://perma.cc/DE4S-JQ27] (arguing stewardship of index funds is 
superior to that of active funds in part because of this conflict of interest). But in light of the 
empirical evidence showing that the mutual fund sponsors that favor passive management 
strategies vote with management most often, it is likely that the incentives to defer to 
management are greater for passively managed funds. See Ryan Bubb & Emiliano Catan, The 
Party Structure of Mutual Funds 3 (Apr. 16, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3124039 (noting that passively 
managed funds, including those under Big Three families, support management at much 
greater rates than other funds). Also, because most mutual fund voting decisions are 
centralized, individual fund managers might not always be able to influence voting decisions 
made for the institution as a whole. See id. at 29. 
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assets under management (other than slashing fees and putting pressure on the 
institution’s margins) is to develop and maintain close relationships with the 
source of corporate 401(k) assets: management. These mutual fund sponsors 
may also hope to convince management to utilize other services provided by the 
sponsor. 
These conflicts likely affect the institution’s voting—it is in the institution’s 
best interest to side with management on important votes, even when voting 
against management would be better for shareholders. Put simply, as Jack Bogle, 
founder of Vanguard, explained in an SEC comment letter supporting a rule 
requiring mutual fund vote disclosure: “Votes against management may 
jeopardize the retention of clients of 401(k) and pension accounts.”156 
The calculus is simple. Suppose a vote against management would be in the 
shareholders’ best interest. Nonetheless, any gain to shareholders will benefit 
the institution only indirectly. If taking an anti-management stance is expected 
to increase the portfolio’s value by $1,000, the institution’s revenue will increase 
by $5 if management fees are 0.5% of assets under management, and $6 if fees 
are 0.6% (a more realistic number for passively managed funds).157 Furthermore, 
the improved performance will not mean much to passive fund investors, all of 
whom expect the fund to replicate the performance of the index anyway. Put 
differently, it is highly uncertain whether a fund will attract new clients on the 
basis of its pro-shareholder activism. However, if the institution’s activism is 
likely to alienate management, it will put millions of dollars of client assets at 
risk, potentially leading to large losses for the institution.158 
There are a few prominent examples of Corporate Client Conflict affecting 
mutual fund voting. For example, in 2004, after the SEC first required mutual 
funds to disclose their votes, it came to light that a few large mutual fund 
sponsors, including Fidelity, had voted against shareholder proposals to expense 
employee stock options, which was viewed by many in the investment 
community as a more honest accounting practice than the alternative.159 
Immediately, the charge was levied that the management-friendly votes were the 
result of a conflict of interest. The New York Times noted that Fidelity voted 
against a shareholder proposal at Intel, where Fidelity served as the recordkeeper 
for Intel 401(k) accounts worth $1 billion.160 In addition, a study of the stock 
option expensing proposals found evidence that institutional investors with 
 
156 See Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds, 
85 J FIN. ECON. 552, 554 (2007) (quoting John C. Bogle, Mutual Fund Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 14, 2002, at A35). 
157 See id. at 553. 
158 See id. 
159 Gretchen Morgensen, A Door Opens. The View Is Ugly., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2004, 
§ 3, at 1. 
160 Id. 
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conflicts of interest were less likely to support the shareholder proposal than 
institutional investors with no such conflicts.161 
Recent empirical evidence also supports the hypothesis that mutual fund, and 
in particular passive fund voting, is prone to conflicts of interest that result in a 
pro-management stance. Professors Ryan Bubb and Emilio Catan have shown 
that large mutual fund sponsors—including BlackRock, State Street, and 
Vanguard—support management at greater rates than other institutions and 
third-party proxy advisers Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) and Glass 
Lewis.162 Additional evidence shows that these investors are especially unlikely 
to oppose management on hot-button issues that directly affect management 
teams; in 2017, for example, BlackRock voted for executive compensation 
proposals at S&P 500 companies 98.3% of the time.163 Although 95% of say-
on-pay proposals received shareholder support, BlackRock’s support for 
executive pay packages exceeded even that high level.164 In addition, Professors 
Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Tao Li, and James Pinnington studied proxy contests 
spanning from 2008-2015 and found that large, passively managed mutual fund 
sponsors are much more likely to support management in proxy contests.165 
Bubb and Catan’s research also sheds light on the types of shareholder 
proposals that these large mutual fund sponsors most often support—namely, 
proposals to declassify the board and reduce supermajority voting 
requirements.166 Nonetheless, they are less likely than other investors and third-
party proxy advisors to support the dissident slate in a proxy contest.167 Why do 
institutional investors favor proposals to make the electorate more accountable 
when they so rarely use their increased voting power to challenge incumbent 
directors? Perhaps institutional investors prefer structural arrangements that 
make their votes more powerful because it renders their support more 
meaningful to management. If BlackRock votes to support management when a 
majority of shareholders is all that is needed to catalyze a different course of 
 
161 Fabrizio Ferri, Tatiana Sandino & Garen Markarian, Stock Options Expensing: 
Evidence from Shareholders’ Votes 1 (Oct. 17, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://msbfile03.usc.edu/digitalmeasures/sandino/intellcont/Paper%206%20-
%20Voting%20for%20ESO%20expensing-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6D9-E5LX]. 
162 Bubb & Catan, supra note 155, at 3. 
163 Gretchen Morgenson, Your Fund Has Your Stay, Like It or Not, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 
2016, at BU1. 
164 COMP. ADVISORY PARTNERS, SAY ON PAY VOTE RESULTS (S&P 500) 3 (2017), 
https://www.capartners.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-SoP_Update_5-15-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5H5H-RT4A]. 
165 Alon Brav et al., Picking Friends Before Picking (Proxy) Fights: How Mutual Fund 
Voting Shapes Proxy Contests 3 (Columbia Bus. Sch., Research Paper No. 18-16, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3101473 (finding passive funds support 
management up to 12% more often than active funds). 
166 Bubb & Catan, supra note 155, at 3. 
167 See id. at 20-22 (flagging high support for insurgents in proxy contests among active, 
interventionist investors). 
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action, management will be very grateful. Indeed, management is keenly aware 
that maintaining good relations with their largest investors is an essential defense 
to hedge fund activism.168 It is rational for large mutual fund sponsors to want 
to foster the feeling of dependency. 
Interestingly, Bubb and Catan also find that large mutual fund sponsors 
support management proposals to merge or engage in large acquisitions more 
often than other investors. For example, BlackRock supported such proposals 
79% of the time; Fidelity, 70%; and Vanguard, 85%.169 By contrast, ISS 
recommended approval in only 46% of cases; Glass Lewis, only 50%.170 Cross-
Ownership Conflict, discussed in the previous Section, could explain this 
difference. It could also support the theory that mutual fund sponsors cater to 
management—management is often heavily invested in the transaction it is 
proposing, meaning that the cost of opposition may be substantial. And there is 
at least one poignant example of a conflict of this type coloring a merger vote. 
In 2002, Hewlett-Packard (“H-P”) founder and shareholder Walter Hewlett 
challenged in the Delaware Court of Chancery the contentious merger between 
H-P and Compaq, contending that H-P’s managers used corporate assets to 
entice and coerce Deutsche Asset Management (a subsidiary of Deutsche Bank) 
into switching its votes in favor of the merger.171 In the midst of an intense 
campaign for votes, H-P management secured a multibillion dollar credit facility 
to pay for merger costs and named Deutsche Bank as the co-arranger.172 
Deutsche Asset Management had already cast twenty-five million votes against 
the merger; days later, on the morning of the vote and after a thirty minute call 
with H-P management, Deutsche Asset Management switched seventeen million 
of its votes in favor of the deal. Shareholders ultimately approved the deal by a 
narrow margin.173 Although the Court of Chancery ultimately granted summary 
judgment for H-P on the grounds that the evidence did not establish the company 
had engaged in improper vote buying,174 Deutsche Asset Management’s conflict 
of interest was readily apparent. 
 
168 See PWC, THE SWINGING PENDULUM: BOARD GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF 
SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT 15 (2016), http://www.lexissecuritiesmosaic.com/gateway/ 
sec/speech/assets_pwc-2016-annual-corporate--directors--survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP9T 
-C2SY] (finding half of corporations surveyed regularly communicated with their largest 
shareholders to avoid shareholder activism). 
169 Bubb & Catan, supra note 155, at 38. 
170 Id. at 39. 
171 Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. Civ.A. 19513-NC, 2002 WL 549137, at *1 (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 8, 2002). 
172 Id. at *2-3. 
173 Id. at *1-3 (“[T]he margin between the votes in favor of and those against the merger 
was less than 1% of the shares voted . . . .”). 
174 See Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. CIV.A. 19513-NC, 2002 WL 818091, at *15-
16 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2002). 
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C. Uniform Policy Conflict 
When a mutual fund sponsor casts its portfolio shares uniformly, its corporate 
governance group will have the most influence. This reality helps explain why 
nearly all large mutual fund sponsors have a policy encouraging uniform voting, 
and why some refuse to allow individual fund managers any discretion to depart 
from it. But this preference for uniformity creates a new problem: the funds do 
not have identical portfolios or investors, and thus centralized voting may benefit 
one fund and its investors at the expense of others.175 We provide a few 
illustrative examples in the Sections that follow. 
1. Favoring Active 
Consider Institutional Investor, a large mutual fund sponsor that offers both 
passive and active funds. Institutional Investor houses Fund A, an active fund 
with a large position in TargetCo, and Fund P, an S&P 500 index fund that owns 
shares in both TargetCo and BuyerCo. BuyerCo is larger and therefore Fund P 
holds a bigger position in BuyerCo than it does in TargetCo. 
The corporate governance team must decide whether to vote to approve a 
merger between BuyerCo and TargetCo. To make this decision, they rely on 
Fund A’s managers, who support the deal because it is predicted to benefit 
TargetCo, which has been struggling. The Fund A managers lobby hard for the 
institution to vote all of its shares in favor of the merger. However, because 
BuyerCo will take on TargetCo’s struggling business, as well as its large debt 
obligations, BuyerCo shareholders are less rosy about the merger. Nonetheless, 
Institutional Investor votes all of its shares in favor of the merger. BuyerCo’s 
share price drops after the vote is announced and Fund P investors’ portfolio 
values decline accordingly.176 
This example is unlikely to be rare or uncommon: most large institutional 
corporate governance teams elicit information from their active fund managers, 
while their passive fund managers remain completely uninvolved in corporate 
governance.177 And although the result may be due to an asymmetry in 
information flow, Institutional Investor’s corporate governance team has an 
incentive to use its voting power to benefit its active funds, even at the expense 
of its passive funds. That is because active funds charge higher fees and therefore 
generate more revenue than passive funds.178 Additionally, active funds are 
under extreme pressure to beat the market to justify their higher fees; by contrast, 
investors do not expect anything more than market performance from index 
 
175 See Lipton, Family Loyalty, supra note 38, at 181-83. 
176 These conflicts are likely to crop up elsewhere, too, but as discussed, they are the easiest 
to observe in the merger context. There, the market often views transactions as benefitting 
one group of shareholders more than another. 
177 See BIOY ET AL., supra note 104, at 42, 46. 
178 José-Miguel Gaspar, Massimo Massa & Pedro Matos, Favoritism in Mutual Fund 
Families? Evidence on Strategic Cross-Fund Subsidization, 61 J. FIN. 73, 74 (2006). 
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funds.179 Therefore, in the simple example above, Institutional Investor would 
rationally use its voting power to maximize the value of active funds whenever 
the interests between its active fund investors and passive fund investors 
conflict. Such a strategy would improve the competitive position of its active 
funds, drawing investors into high fee accounts,180 without seriously 
compromising the position of its passive funds.181 Indeed, evidence exists that 
mutual fund sponsors do exactly this—they coordinate their activities to enhance 
the performance of the funds that are most valuable to the institution as a 
whole.182 
2. Favoring Passive 
A related scenario is also possible. Imagine that Institutional Investor has 
many more dollars invested in passive funds than active funds. Institutional 
Investor’s active Fund A has taken a long position in TargetCo. Fund P, like 
most of the institution’s passive funds, has a larger position in BuyerCo than 
TargetCo because of BuyerCo’s large size. 
BuyerCo proposes to buy TargetCo in a deal that is viewed by the market as 
value destroying for BuyerCo, but is expected to benefit TargetCo shareholders. 
In this scenario, Fund A shareholders would want the deal to go through; Fund 
P shareholders would not. If the corporate governance team evaluates the merger 
by asking which course of action will benefit the greatest number of investors, 
it will vote to approve the merger, even though Fund A shareholders will suffer 
losses as a result. 
Although this scenario seems less likely to occur than the first, it is consistent 
with what the large institutional investors that favor passive management claim 
to do: evaluate whether the deal will benefit the largest group of investors, and 
then cast all of the institution’s votes in that direction.183 This approach may be 
the welfare-maximizing for the sponsor, but some of the institution’s investors 
will be left casting votes against their interests. 
3. Equity Funds with Different Investment Goals 
The previous Sections discussed conflicts between active and passive funds, 
but conflicts may also exist between different subsets of funds within each of 
those categories. Vanguard alone offers 130 different mutual funds, including 
 
179 See Edward Rock & Marcel Kahan, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let 
Shareholders Be Shareholders 2 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. 18-39, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3295098. 
180 See Gaspar, Massa & Matos, supra note 178, at 74. 
181 Id. at 101 (“[N]ew inflows to ‘high value’ funds will more than compensate any 
outflows suffered by ‘low value’ funds.”). 
182 See id. at 102. 
183 See BIOY ET AL., supra note 104, at 25-47 (outlining voting strategies of various large 
funds). 
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those that specialize in growth, income, and value investment strategies.184 It 
also offers target-date funds that span from a retirement date beginning in 2015 
to 2065. Those portfolio managers should have different preferences for 
governance; there is no way to adopt an institution-wide voting policy and then 
vote all of the institution’s shares in lockstep without sacrificing the investment 
objectives of some funds. 
Consider differences between the governance preferences of a portfolio 
manager at a growth fund, which targets companies with high growth prospects, 
and an income fund, which seeks to generate an income stream for shareholders 
in the form of dividends or interest payments. When asked to weigh in on a 
shareholder activist who wants the company to increase dividend payments to 
shareholders, the portfolio managers will have very different views. The 
governance preferences of a portfolio manager at a growth fund should also 
differ from those of a portfolio manager at a value fund, which seeks to invest 
in stocks that the market undervalues. In particular, that value fund portfolio 
manager should be less rosy about current management and perhaps more 
interested in supporting shareholder activism than her growth fund rival. 
Despite these different investment theses, there is often ownership overlap 
across value, growth, and income funds.185 For example, 28% of the companies 
appearing in the BlackRock’s iShares S&P 500 Value ETF also appear in its 
iShares S&P 500 Growth ETF.186 Vanguard’s growth and value funds also 
feature 5% overlap.187 Adherence to a centralized voting strategy for these 
companies may not be in the best interests of all of the institution’s investors. 
For target date funds that invest in individual stocks,188 a different conflict 
emerges: their different time horizons may lead investment managers to have 
differences in opinion when asked to weigh in on governance, the advisability 
of shareholder activism, and M&A, among other issues. Quite obviously, a 
target date fund with an end point that is close in time is less likely to take a 
 
184 Vanguard Mutual Funds, VANGUARD, https://investor.vanguard.com/mutual-
funds/list#/mutual-funds/asset-class/month-end-returns [https://perma.cc/9JTY-V893] (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2019). 
185 Rob Silverblatt, How to Avoid Portfolio Overlap, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 19, 
2010, 10:49 AM), https://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/fund-observer/2010/05/19/how-
to-avoid-portfolio-overlap (noting portfolio overlap is common). 
186 Ryan Vlastelica, A Major Value Fund Mirrors a Major Growth One More Than You 
May Expect, MARKETWATCH (June 19, 2017, 5:37 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/ 
a-major-value-fund-mirrors-a-major-growth-one-more-than-you-may-expect-2017-06-19 
[https://perma.cc/UCR3-AR3B]; see also Julie Clarenbach, Value? Growth? Both!, MOTLEY 
FOOL (Jan. 2, 2009, 12:00 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2009/01/02/value-
growth-both.aspx [https://perma.cc/V4YB-TYD2] (lauding diversified funds as key 
investment strategy). 
187 Vlastelica, supra note 186 (comparing overlap of various large funds). 
188 Not all target date funds invest in stocks directly; some invest in other mutual funds 
(and are accordingly referred to as “funds of funds”). 
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long-term view. Nonetheless, when an institution votes its shares in lockstep to 
advance a long-term perspective, those investors will sometimes be worse off. 
4. Favoring Debt 
Consider the same scenario as above: Institutional Investor is considering 
whether to vote to approve a merger between BuyerCo and TargetCo, and the 
market views the deal as good for TargetCo and terrible for BuyerCo. This time, 
the institution’s active and passive funds are aligned; both have a larger 
investment in TargetCo than they do in BuyerCo. But Fund D, a mezzanine debt 
fund, has a large debt position in BuyerCo and is concerned that if the merger is 
approved, BuyerCo will be in danger of defaulting on its debt, which would be 
a disaster for the fund. Accordingly, Fund D’s portfolio manager vocally 
opposes the deal and lobbies the corporate governance team to vote against it.189 
Again, there is no way for Institutional Investor to vote its shares uniformly 
without causing some of its investors to vote against their interests. 
5. Favoring Vocal Investors 
The next example involves conflicts between a vocal minority of investors 
and an apathetic majority. Imagine that Institutional Investor is considering 
whether to vote yes on a proposal to require Energy Company to disclose how 
it plans to manage environmental and safety risks. Employees of the company 
support additional disclosure, as they predict that it will lead to better working 
conditions. Management opposes the proposal, contending that it represents an 
incursion into their authority to manage the business and affairs of the company, 
will take time and money to put together the report, and is distracting to 
management at best and harmful to the company’s competitiveness at worst. 
Institutional Investor believes that the majority of its shareholders are or would 
be opposed to the proposal. But a large and vocal investor, Public Pension Fund, 
is strongly in favor. Institutional Investor knows that Public Pension Fund would 
be likely to take its large portfolio elsewhere if the proposal fails; Pubic Pension 
Fund’s board of governors are up for election this year and they are facing 
pressure to deliver results that indicate that their stewardship is benefitting 
employees. Institutional Investor will have an incentive to vote yes for the 
proposal, even if the majority of its investors opposes it, because the rational 
apathy of the dispersed investors is no match for the extreme preference of a 
client with a large portfolio.190 
 
189 Professors William Birdthistle and Todd Henderson have explored these conflicts in 
the context of private equity. See generally William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, 
One Hat Too Many? Investment Desegregation in Private Equity, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 45 
(2009) (discussing conflicts of interest arising from investing in both private equity and public 
debt). 
190 By way of example, CalPERS, the California public pension fund, uses a set of 
environmental, social, and governance criteria to evaluate investments and push companies 
to adopt certain progressive policies. Though some groups have attacked this strategy, others, 
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6. Favoring Something Else? 
This last Section explores other considerations that may color the voting of 
large mutual fund sponsors. Recently, the view that companies should single-
handedly focus on shareholder wealth maximization has been challenged from 
many directions. Perhaps most prominently, Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, 
has written: “To prosper over time, every company must not only deliver 
financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution to 
society. Companies must benefit all of their stakeholders, including 
shareholders, employees, customers, and the communities in which they 
operate.”191 Even more controversially, Fink announced that BlackRock, as one 
of the largest and most influential investors across 14,000 companies world-
wide, would enforce this mandate with engagement and voting.192 
This position has generated both applause as well as criticism, as has 
BlackRock’s decision to use its voting prowess to support controversial 
shareholder proposals.193 Regardless of our beliefs about the merits of these 
proposals, the fact remains that some BlackRock shareholders are opposed to 
them.194 In theory, the corporate governance team is making a judgment call 
about what is in the best long-term interest of its shareholders, and although 
these teams are composed of experts, they too are human actors affected by 
conflicts of interest—the desire to keep management or other clients happy, or 
the desire to further their personal political goals.195 Because governance is 
challenging to evaluate, it will rarely be clear whether any given vote was the 
product of truly disinterested evaluation. 
 
such as BlackRock, have begun to show interest. Sunny Oh, Think-Tank Funded by Koch 
Brothers Challenges CalPERS’ ESG Strategy, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 12, 2017, 1:04 PM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/think-tank-funded-by-koch-brothers-challenges-
calpers-esg-strategy-2017-12-12 [https://perma.cc/6VMZ-2FBV]. 
191 Larry Fink, 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK, 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter 
[https://perma.cc/W9WE-L7PM] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019). 
192 Id. (describing BlackRock’s focus on company engagement). 
193 See, e.g., Matt Levine, Opinion, Larry Fink’s Warning to CEOs Rings Hollow, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 17, 2018, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-
01-17/larry-fink-s-warning-to-ceos-rings-hollow (“It’s going to take more than a strongly-
worded letter to create change.”); Sorkin, supra note 143 (hailing BlackRock’s move as a 
“watershed moment on Wall Street”). 
194 See Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L. 217, 234 (2018) 
(“Distortions in mutual fund voting may occur if the way mutual funds vote does not match 
the preferences of mutual fund investors.”). 
195 Fund managers are more likely to vote in favor of management-sponsored proposals at 
locally headquartered companies, suggesting that “social networks and interactions between 
firm executives and fund managers impact the latter’s proxy voting decisions.” Praveen K. 
Das, Geographical Proximity and Mutual Funds’ Proxy Voting Behavior, 32 MANAGERIAL & 
DECISION ECON. 425, 426 (2011) (further noting that many business decisions are impacted 
by decision maker’s familiarity with subject). 
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III. CONFLICTED MUTUAL FUND VOTES SHOULD NOT COUNT AS 
DISINTERESTED 
When is a vote worthy of deference? Delaware courts have emphasized that 
deference doctrines espoused in M & F Worldwide and Corwin are only 
applicable when the vote is by disinterested decision makers. We contend that 
Delaware should read this requirement to exclude mutual fund votes that are 
prone to conflicts of interest, and specifically, those that may be the product of 
Cross-Ownership Conflict or Corporate Client Conflict.196 In thoses situations, 
the court has reason to be skeptical that the outcome of the vote is one that the 
company’s undiversified investors would necessarily embrace.  
We focus on mutual fund voting for several reasons. For one, the mutual fund 
conflicts that we describe are relatively easy for courts to observe and measure. 
In addition, mutual funds are unique in experiencing these recurring and 
predictable conflicts: for example, pension funds, hedge funds, and retail 
investors are not subject to the Corporate Client Conflict. Mutual funds are also 
broadly diversified and generally adhere to a centralized governance model, 
making the Cross-Ownership Conflict especially pronounced. Perhaps most 
importantly, mutual funds are now the key decision makers in corporate votes—
they dictate the outcomes in M&A decisions as well as proxy contests and other 
contested matters. And when the largest shareholders suffer from recurring 
conflicts that pit them against the real parties in interest, the justification for 
deferring to their decisions becomes increasingly tenuous.197 
To be clear, we do not believe that the refusal to defer to conflicted votes will 
necessarily reduce the influence of these conflicts in governance (and future 
research should consider whether government regulation is necessary to ensure 
 
196 We include the Uniform Policy Conflict in our typology for the sake of completeness, 
but do not advocate that courts make an inquiry into this conflict as well. Most important, it 
would be administratively difficult for courts to determine whether an investor’s votes were 
being cast to benefit some other group of investors within the institution. Future research 
should determine whether fund sponsors are doing enough to minimize the prevalence of this 
conflict in voting. Compare Rock & Kahan, supra note 179, at 49 (contending that these 
conflicts can be handled on case-by-case basis when they arise), with Lipton, Family Loyalty, 
supra note 38, at 175 (contending that mutual fund boards should develop procedures to 
ensure that fund shares are voted with view toward advancing best interests of that particular 
fund). 
197 This is not to say that hedge funds and pension funds do not suffer from conflicts of 
interest as a result of intermediation—there is a large literature documenting these. We do not 
address them here, however, for a few reasons. For one, these conflicts would be more 
difficult for courts to observe. For example, public pension funds are appointed by politicians 
or directly elected by voters and so may be especially sensitive to political pressure. See 
Edward B. Rock, supra note 98, at 365. But determining whether a pension fund’s vote was 
affected by political interests would be challenging and invite speculative arguments. In 
addition, mutual fund conflicts are not only observable, they are pervasive. Recall the 
evidence that mutual fund empty voting occurs with regularity; hedge fund empty voting, 
despite its extensive treatment in the literature, is much rarer. See supra notes 120-23 and 
accompanying text. 
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that mutual fund fiduciaries use their governance rights to further their investors’ 
best interests).198 Instead, interpreting “disinterested” to exclude economic 
conflicts will ensure that business judgment deference applies only when the 
parties in interest have clearly spoken in favor of the transaction. 
Although Delaware courts generally police conflicts at the director level, 
considering conflicts at the shareholder level is not foreign to Delaware law. For 
example, in In re CNX Gas,199 the Court of Chancery considered evidence of 
Cross-Ownership Conflict in determining whether a large shareholder’s vote 
could be counted for majority-of-the-minority approval of a tender offer.200 In 
that case, Consol, a publicly traded company, was the majority shareholder of 
CNX Gas and planned to buy out the public shareholders using a tender offer. 
Like most companies, the vast majority of the public float was held by 
institutional investors, and the largest minority shareholder was the mutual fund 
sponsor T. Rowe Price. Accordingly, Consol approached T. Rowe Price and 
negotiated an agreement for T. Rowe to sell all of its shares before proposing a 
tender offer to the other minority shareholders.201 
But T. Rowe also had a substantial minority stake in Consol, and one of its 
funds held a significant amount of Consol debt.202 As such, T. Rowe stood on 
both sides of the transaction—the incentive for Consol to pay top dollar was 
dampened as a result of these cross-holdings. When the terms of the deal were 
challenged by the other minority shareholders, the Court of Chancery 
determined that the conflict rendered T. Rowe interested; T. Rowe was “fully 
hedged and indifferent to the allocation of value between Consol and CNX 
Gas.”203 As such, T. Rowe could not be counted for purposes of a majority-of-
minority vote necessary to avoid a showing that the tender offer price was fair.204 
In reaching this decision, the Court of Chancery recognized that it did not 
intend to encourage “generalized fishing expeditions” into shareholder 
motives.205 We likewise recognize that all shareholders hold private interests 
that may cause their preferences to diverge from those of other shareholders. 
Our aim is not to open the floodgates to litigation over all kinds of shareholder 
interests, but rather to those that create a clear economic conflict of interest and 
 
198 For example, Professor Lipton has proposed that one way to alleviate the Cross-
Holding Conflict would be to expand the right of appraisal for shareholders that have different 
preferences. Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, supra note 38, at 140 (“Appraisal provides 
a mechanism for satisfying the entire shareholder base.”). For a discussion of the existing law 
regulating mutual fund conflicts of interest, see Lipton, Family Loyalty, supra note 37, at 178-
83. 
199 4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
200 Id. at 420. 
201 Id. at 401-02. 
202 Id. at 402 (noting T. Rowe Price owned 6.3% of Consol’s outstanding stock). 
203 Id. at 416. 
204 Id. (“T. Rowe Price[] has materially different incentives than a holder of CNX Gas 
common stock . . . .”). 
205 Id. at 417. 
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that are easily observable by courts. As the Court of Chancery found, the conflict 
facing T. Rowe put it in a very different position than the other shareholders. 
And including T. Rowe as part of the “minority” would weaken the bargaining 
position of the other minority shareholders.206 
Although CNX Gas involved a tender offer, the logic applies to third-party 
mergers and controlling shareholder transactions as well. And the argument is 
likely to surface again in that context. When it does, courts should take into 
account those conflicts before applying the deference doctrines espoused in M 
& F Worldwide and Corwin. That is not to say that these deference doctrines, 
which have done much good by screening out meritless litigation, should be 
eliminated. Instead, we propose an analytical refinement that would take major 
mutual fund shareholder conflicts into consideration before deference doctrines 
are applied. First, drawing on CNX Gas, we provide a framework to guide 
plaintiffs who wish to rebut M & F Worldwide or Corwin (and the courts who 
must evaluate those arguments). Second, we describe how this approach would 
benefit investors without unduly burdening transactional planners or leading to 
meritless litigation. 
We propose that if plaintiffs can present evidence (on the basis of a section 
220 request or other public information) that either (1) the target or acquirer 
company is a client of the fund family, or (2) the fund family has significant 
cross-holdings in both the target or acquirer, then any shares voted subject to 
such conflicts should not be treated as disinterested. The court’s inquiry could 
end with this finding. The court need not evaluate evidence about the fund 
family’s actual motives for voting—the presence of the economic conflict would 
simply render those votes excluded from the Corwin/M & F Worldwide 
calculus.207 
Although section 220 requests may take time and generate litigation of their 
own, the procedural posture of post-closing damages actions means that litigants 
will have time for the section 220 process to play out. In addition, the discovery 
burdens should be relatively easy for the company to manage. Information about 
Corporate Client Conflict can generally be found in public company filings, as 
can information about major shareholder cross-holdings. For information that is 
not publicly available, the information sought is akin to a shareholder list. All of 
this information is documentary. There is no need for depositions, expert reports, 
or anything else that would drive up costs and create leverage on the plaintiffs’ 
side. 
Had the Court of Chancery followed this approach in the Tesla litigation, it is 
likely that 45.7% of the supposedly disinterested shareholders that voted to 
 
206 Id. 
207 Delaware courts would need to consider what to do in cases where excluding conflicted 
votes leaves only a small number of minority shareholders. In those cases, a very small 
shareholder could nonetheless wield substantial influence over the vote, increasing the 
potential for distortions and hold outs. 
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approve the transaction would not have been counted.208 Tesla’s largest 
institutional shareholder—Fidelity—would have also been excluded because it 
had Corporate Client Conflict: Fidelity is the main recordholder of Tesla’s 
401(k) accounts.209 And if these “yes” votes had been excluded, then the 
transaction would have received approval from less than 40% of the 
disinterested stockholders210—not enough to render it eligible for business 
judgment rule protection. In other words, this approach would have permitted 
litigaton to proceed without requiring the court to designate Musk—who had 
only a 22% stake in Tesla—as a controlling shareholder. 
This approach is also consistent with the rationale used by courts that apply 
deferential business judgment protection to transactions approved by 
disinterested shareholders: when the parties in interest have spoken, courts 
should not second guess their choices. When there is clear evidence indicating 
that the parties in interest did not speak in favor of the transaction, and those 
who did had a reason to vote against their interests, it is especially important to 
preserve an opportunity for judicial review. If, for example, the largest 
shareholders may be inclined to follow management in order to preserve access 
or to benefit another investment, we can be less certain that the underlying 
transaction will benefit the ultimate investors. As we saw in the Tesla-SolarCity 
merger, conflicted shareholders may be quick to say yes even when the 
transaction’s undesirable features are visible to everyone that is looking. 
Additionally, a key benefit of a minority-of-the-majority voting requirement 
is that it operates to protect minority shareholders ex ante. If management wants 
the deal to be accepted without litigation risk, it will need to ensure that the 
transaction is desirable for the disinterested minority. However, when conflicted 
voters can drown out the disinterested minority, management will have to worry 
less about negotiating a deal that will secure their approval. Recall that nearly 
46% of Tesla’s “disinterested” shareholders were also SolarCity investors. 
Although management could not be certain that those cross-holders would vote 
yes for that reason, the conflict made disinterested shareholder approval more 
likely, despite (and perhaps because of) the obvious fact that the deal was a rotten 
one for Tesla. Indeed, Tesla’s four largest stockholders stood to lose over half a 
 
208 See In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 1560293, 
at *10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018) (noting that Tesla executives owning stock in both Tesla and 
SolarCity were not excluded from voting). 
209 Tesla Motors, Inc. 401k Plan, BRIGHTSCOPE, https://www.brightscope.com/form-
5500/basic-info/403609/Tesla-Inc/408890/Tesla-Motors-Inc-401k-Plan/2017/ 
[https://perma.cc/YA8A-WQSQ] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019). 
210 Plaintiffs’ Answering Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second 
Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 34 (“[O]nly 38.7% of eligible Tesla stockholders voted 
to approve the Acquisition.”). 
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billion dollars in the event of a SolarCity bankruptcy.211 And as discussed, Tesla 
is not an isolated example.212 
Interpreting M & F Worldwide and Corwin to exclude shareholders with 
economic conflicts of interest means that management will have to work harder 
to ensure that the transaction is fair to the real parties in interest if it wants to 
avoid judicial review. In addition, excluding conflicted shareholders improves 
the bargaining position of minority shareholders who may have concerns about 
the merger. The result: better M&A outcomes for minority shareholders. That is 
so even if management responds to this doctrinal shift by utilizing a majority-
of-the-minority vote less often. In such cases, minority shareholders will have 
another source of protection—the Delaware courts, who will consider whether 
the transaction was entirely fair to them. 
We recognize that M & F Worldwide and Corwin arose out of concerns about 
a rapid increase in nonmeritorious litigation over M&A transactions—litigation 
that benefitted plaintiffs’ lawyers at the expense of investors and taxpayers. But 
we think that considering conflicts at the large shareholder level would not 
dramatically change the operation of those doctrines. As discussed, a 2010 study 
analyzing M&A deals involving publicly traded companies during 1998-2004 
revealed that in 41.7% of the deals, the acquiring and target firms shared some 
of the same owners.213 This means that the majority of mergers do not involve 
Cross-Ownership Conflict, and therefore, in the majority of cases, the deference 
doctrines espoused in M & F Worldwide and Corwin would apply without 
change. Furthermore, the study revealed that when cross-holdings existed, the 
cross-holders made up 18.9% of the company’s shareholders on average.214 In 
many cases, therefore, excluding the cross-holders would not likely change the 
outcome of the vote. Of course, plaintiffs can also look for evidence of client 
relationships as a source of conflict between the institutional investor and the 
merger. However, companies generally only use a single mutual fund family to 
manage their 401(k) assets—therefore, that conflict would only affect, at most, 
two mutual fund sponsors in any given deal. In sum, even though the incidence 
of Cross-Ownership and Corporate Client Conflicts is substantial, considering 
these conflicts will not neuter the operation of the deference doctrines that have 
done much to control abusive litigation. Instead, our proposed approach would 
ensure that the use of these doctrines is limited to the situations where they are 
likely to do the most good. 
Likewise, the prospect of discovery on shareholder conflicts is unlikely to 
change the bargaining position of litigants and create pressure for defendants to 
 
211 Amended Verified Derivative Complaint at 16-17, In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder 
Litig., No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 1560293 (Del. Ch. Oct. 4, 2016). 
212 See supra text accompanying notes 161-165 (discussing various sitiuations in which 
institutional investors vote against shareholder interests). 
213 See Goranova, Dharwadkar & Brandes, supra note 136, at 1115. 
214 Id. (noting that investor overlap is increasingly common as institutional investors 
supplant individual and family owners). 
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settle. As discussed, information about Corporate Client and Cross-Ownership 
Conflict is easy to find in public documents; anything that is not publicly 
available could be produced in a section 220 request. In addition, transactional 
planners will be able to easily respond by accounting for conflicts ex ante, when 
they are structuring the transaction.  
In sum, considering these economic conflicts would preserve judicial scrutiny 
of mergers in situations where conflicts likely influenced the outcome of the vote 
without undoing the benefits that M & F Worldwide and Corwin provide 
transactional planners and shareholders.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has analyzed the impact of mutual fund conflicts of interest on 
shareholder voting. It has described typical conflicts arising from intermediated 
mutual fund ownership. It has also argued that honest acknowledgment of these 
conflicts requires specific changes to Delaware corporate law. Doing so would 
serve to realign institutional voting with investor interests, thereby alleviating 
the potential inefficiencies created by the spread of intermediary shareholding. 
Of course, this Article only scratches the surface in analyzing how conflicts 
of interest affect mutual fund voting. Although conflicts likely affect decisions 
on other issues, we have here confined ourselves to issues arising in M&A 
transactions. In addition, we focused on Delaware corporate law remedies, rather 
than suggesting broader regulatory reform. We leave those projects for another 
day.  
 
 
